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AN

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

CAMPAIGN OF 1815,

ILLUSTRATED BY

PLANS OF THE OPERATIONS

AND OF THE

BATTLES OF QUATRE BRAS, LIGNY,

AND

WATERLOO.

32119
ac

BY CAPTAIN BATTY,

OF THE FIRST OR GRENADIER GUARDS; MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ORDER OF ST. ANNE.

"I Romani dubitando meno dei pericoli per gli ordini loro buoni, non diffidando della vittoria, fermi ed ostinati combattevano col medesimo animo e con la medesima virtù nel fine, che nel principio."

Machiavelli, Discorsi, Libro Terzo, Cap. xxvi.

SECOND EDITION, CONSIDERABLY ENLARGED.

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LONDON:

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1820.

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LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

TO

HIS EXCELLENCY

COUNT MICHEL WORONZOW,

Lieutenant-General of the Imperial Russian Army; Aide-de-camp to H. M. the Emperor of all the Russias; Knight of the Order of St. Alexander of the First Class, of the Order of St. George of the Second Class, of St. Wladimir of the First Class, of St. Anne of the First Class; Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, of the Order of St. Louis of the First Class, of the Swedish Order of the Sword, of the Prussian Order of the Red Eagle, of the Imperial Austrian Order of Maria Theresa, &c. &c. &c.

THIS

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

CAMPAIGN OF 1815

IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

as a small tribute to his distinguished talents, and great private worth; and as an expression of the gratification and instruction derived by the author, whilst attached to his personal staff, during the period he commanded the Russian army of occupation in France; also, as a mark of the pride he feels in being honoured by his friendship, and as a testimonial of grateful remembrance of the many great obligations conferred by him, on

his most devoted servant,

ROBERT BATTY.

London,
April 15, 1820.

PREFACE.

During the interval which has elapsed since the campaign of 1815, the author, whilst attached to the staff of His Excellency Lieutenant-General Count Woronzow, had frequent opportunities of making inquiries, and collecting information respecting its different occurrences: this he has done with the desire of gaining professional knowledge, aware that a single military operation well examined and understood, would afford more useful information than the study of theoretical works. He has had the good fortune to become acquainted with officers of high merit in both contending armies, whose observations

have been carefully stored, and he has subsequently employed his leisure moments in arranging these materials, and incorporating them with the account of the campaign he had already published in 1815.

In all military narratives much detail about positions and corps is almost inevitable, for without this, only a very imperfect notion can be attained of the contests to which they refer, and the author is aware of the difficulty he encounters in publishing this narrative, which is unusually replete with them. But on the other hand, he feels confident, that there are many, especially military men, who will consider them as vouchers for the accuracy of his account, and he has therefore not hesitated to embody them in the work, throughout which the strictest attention has been paid to placing the several events in as fair and impartial a light as possible.

The Plans originally published were made from sketches taken on the spot, and from memoranda made during the actions. Plans of the invasions of Italy and France, and of the battle of Ligny, have been added; and although they are far from being as complete as could be wished, they will assist, in some degree, the intelligence of the operations: but it is requested that it may be borne in mind, that all the plans are intended to convey an idea of the chief character, and not to give the minute detail of the various events of each battle.

ERRATA.

Page 38, line 19, *for* bridge, *read* bridges.
48, 15, *for* Vinche, *read* Vincke.
48, 19, *for* Kemp, *read* Kempt.
61, 5, *for* Girard, *read* Gérard.
67, 10, *for* Belgium, *read* Belgian.
74, 5, *for* making, *read* masking.
80, 20, *for* Dowzelot, *read* Donzelot.
93, 23, *for* Dowzelot, *read* Donzelot.
94, 15, *for* charges, *read* changes.
95, 11, *for* Dowzelot, *read* Donzelot.
116, 16, *for* halt, *read* march.

AN

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

CAMPAIGN OF 1815.

THE treaty of Paris, in 1814, had traced the outline of the political relationship of the European States, but the claims of the several powers were yet to be discussed in the congress of Vienna, which, after long and anxious expectation, was opened in the month of October, 1814. The various interests of the different cabinets were so difficult to adjust, that nearly six months elapsed from that period, without any important result being announced: the armies of the several states had been retained upon a war establishment, and the probability of a durable peace seemed nearly as far removed as at the commencement of the discussions.

It was at this period that Napoleon, aware of the discussions at Vienna, and of the poli-

tical and discontented state of France, assembled his faithful followers on the 25th of Feb. 1815, and announcing his intended return to France, immediately embarked and set sail. His arrival in the Gulf of Juan, and landing on the 1st of March, with his triumphant progress to the capital, which he reached on the 20th of the same month, are too well known to require a fresh detail. The news of this event spread with the utmost rapidity over all Europe, and the alarm which it occasioned in the congress of Vienna contributed materially to shorten its deliberations. The allied sovereigns deemed the maintenance of peace, and of the independence of their states impossible, whilst the dynasty of Napoleon possessed the throne of France. His overthrow was therefore determined on, and a declaration* to this effect was made public soon after the news of his landing had reached Vienna.

France, again menaced with invasion, left no means untried to maintain peace, but every offer was rejected; war therefore was inevitable, and much as she had been weakened by her former campaigns, the eagerness with

* See Appendix, No. I.

which her soldiers, of almost every class, flocked to the imperial standard, and the enthusiasm with which the return of Napoleon had been hailed, united to the extreme activity displayed by his executive government in organizing a system of national defence, made it evident that nothing less than a force superior to that of all France could accomplish his deposition.

England, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, as well as the minor states of Germany, began to make preparations for the accomplishment of their declared purpose. Troops from the remotest part of the Austrian dominions successively arrived at Vienna, and on the 2d of April began their march towards the Rhine. The Russian armies, scarce arrived on their own frontiers, received orders to return, and the numerous columns of that vast empire again traversed the whole of Germany. The Prussian army began to assemble on the banks of the Meuse and the Moselle, and the small English corps which had remained in Belgium since the campaign of the former year received reinforcements with a rapidity which must have astonished all Europe. Bavaria, and the minor states of Germany, alike assembled their forces, and it was calculated that by the end of May

near five hundred thousand men might be collected on the French frontier.

The rash attempt of Murat against the north of Italy creating at this period the powerful diversion of near a hundred and twenty thousand Austrian troops from marching immediately against France, renders a cursory view of the chief occurrences in Italy necessary, prior to entering into a detail of the preparations for war made respectively by France and the allies.

The proceedings of the congress at Vienna had, no doubt, rendered the stability of Murat on his throne very doubtful: the Bourbons had constantly refused to acknowledge his sovereignty, and it is sufficient to read the letter* from Talleyrand to Lord Castlereagh, to show that the King of Naples had just grounds for his suspicions; he had accordingly, for some time past, been strengthening his forces, and had applied to the Austrian government to allow the passage of his army through middle and upper Italy, with intent to attack the south of France, where troops had already be-

* See Appendix, No. II.

INVASION of ITALY by MURAT.
May 1815.



Drawn & Engraved by Capt Batty.

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gan to assemble for its protection. It is almost superfluous to add that such a demand was rejected; Austria herself began to take the alarm, and reinforced her troops in the states of Lombardy, then under the orders of Marshal Bellegarde.

The successful termination of the enterprise, which again placed Napoleon at the head of the French empire, seemed the signal for the advance of the King of Naples, who had received assurances that the Austrians were making preparations to attack him; he therefore resolved on waiting no longer: his army was now completely organized, and consisted of 82,000 effective men, including 7009 cavalry. It was distributed in the following divisions, viz. of

Carascosa,
Lecchi,
Ambrosio,
Pignatelli Cerchiara,
Livron, and
Pignatelli Strongolî.

These divisions averaged from 12,000 to 15,000 men each, with the exception of the

two latter, which were of the guards, and together amounted to 10,000 men.

The cavalry, as before stated, amounted to 7009 men. The train of artillery consisted of 90 pieces of cannon.

A passage was demanded for the divisions of Livron and Pignatelli Strongoli through the Roman states, and on its being refused, they notwithstanding passed the Roman frontier on the 22d of March. The Pope retired into the Genoese territory, and Cardinal Somaglia, who had been left in charge of the papal government, protested against this infringement of its rights.

The King established his head-quarters at Ancona with the remainder of his army. The division of General Carascosa, with a few pieces of artillery, was the first to advance on the great road towards Bologna: it was followed by those of Lecchi and Ambrosio, with 3000 cavalry and some artillery, which, together with that attached to Carascosa's division, amounted to 30 pieces of cannon. On the 29th, the head-quarters of the King were at Rimini,

and on the 30th he issued a proclamation*, calling upon the Italians to assert their independence, promising them a national representation, and a constitution adapted to the age, by which their individual liberty and property would be guaranteed.

The inhabitants of the north of Italy, governed by a nation totally different in language, manners, and every characteristic quality, looked on the approach of the Neapolitan army as that of their liberators: their hatred of the Austrians, which they had long with difficulty suppressed, now broke out into open violence in some of the principal towns. Many of the nobles, fearing the success of the independents, sent a deputation to Vienna, expressive of their attachment to the Austrian government, and of their determination to support it. This raised the indignation of the people to the highest pitch; the Austrian Generals were openly hooted in the streets of Milan, and placards were posted in many parts of the town, with "Death to the nobles! Long live the independence of Italy!" inscribed on them.

* See Appendix, No. III.

Numerous arrestations followed; a military tribunal was established; and many of the military, who had refused to serve under the Austrian government, were sent under escort into Germany.

On the 5th of April, Marshal Bellegarde issued a proclamation, in order to counteract the dangerous effects which might be produced by that of Murat; and the Austrian government, now seriously menaced in this part of its possessions, rapidly reinforced its army, the command of which was confided to Baron Frimont. This general, aware of the facility that presented itself to Murat, of marching direct upon Milan, established his head-quarters at Piacenza, and concentrated the Austrian forces between that place and Casal-Maggiore, for the purpose of defending the line of the Po, till reinforcements should arrive.

On the 30th of March, the advanced guard of the Austrians under General Bianchi were driven back in an engagement between Savignano and Cesena, and the Neapolitan head-quarters were established on the 1st of April at Faenza, and on the 2d at Bologna. Bianchi

retreated upon Modena, and took up a position behind the Panaro; a smart action ensued between his troops and those of Carascosa, who made a vigorous attack upon his position; the King of Naples sent a column by his left upon Spilembergo to turn the right flank of the Austrians, and having supported the attack made by Carascosa, drove the Austrians from their position, and compelled them to seek safety behind the canal of Bentivoglio and the tête-de-pont of Borgoforte on the Po. This victory threw open Modena, Reggio, and Carpi, to the Neapolitans; the two latter places were immediately occupied by Carascosa's division, whilst the king, with those of Lecchi and Ambrosio, moved on Ferrara and the tête-de-pont of Occhiobello. The citadel of Ferrara withstood the efforts of the Neopolitans to take it, and on the 8th of April, Murat made an attempt to pass the Po at Occhiobello: he was repulsed, and a renewed attack on the following day was alike unsuccessful; the obstinate defence of the Austrians under General Mohr, joined to the advantageous position of their artillery, compelling the Neapolitans to retreat with the loss, it is said, in these two days, of near 2,000 men.

Meanwhile the divisions of Livron and Pignatelli Strongoli had passed unmolested through the Roman States and through great part of Tuscany: on the 7th and 8th of April they occupied Florence. General Nugent, with a small body of Austrian and Florentine troops, was compelled to retire upon Pistoia, followed by the Neapolitans, with whom he had partial engagements on the 8th and 10th; but having received reinforcements and occupied a strong position, he was enabled to hold the enemy in check.

This was the critical moment of Murat's campaign, having neither flank supported; with the Austrian army of Frimont in his front, and with that of Nugent in his rear; a wavering policy must of necessity fail. It was on the left bank of the Po that he must look for support from the partizans of independence; his arrival at Milan was confidently looked for, and near forty thousand Italians, the greater part of whom had served in the armies of Napoleon, were ready to join his standard the moment of his arrival; whereas, on the line of operation which he had chosen, he met with difficulties which he was unable to surmount, and the fatal delay

which they occasioned compelled him to a defensive warfare.

Baron Frimont, aware that the citadel of Ferrara could not make a long resistance, determined on becoming the assailant. He directed General Bianchi upon Carpi, which was held by General Pepe's brigade of the division of Carascosa; another column was directed on Quartirofolo, to cut off his retreat; but this movement being discovered by Carascosa, he withdrew behind the Secchia and from thence behind the Panaro, where he was joined by the remainder of his division, which had been obliged to evacuate Reggio and Modena. Murat, in order to render this position more secure, had entrenched his right flank, and placed a brigade at Spilembergo to protect his left. In this position Ferrara was still menaced, and Frimont therefore ordered a fresh attack to be made: the Austrians marched in three columns; the first, from the tête-de-pont of Occhiobello, upon Ravalle and Casaglia, where Ambrosio's division was entrenched, in order to threaten the rear of the Neapolitans; the second, under General Nieppeg, upon their right flank; and the third, under General Stephanini, upon Mirandola. On the afternoon of the 12th a severe

engagement took place between the troops of Mohr and those of Ambrosio, in which, after a brave defence, the latter were driven from their entrenched position, back on the Bologna road. On the 14th, Frimont attempted to force the passage of the Panaro, but was repulsed; Murat, however, finding his efforts to pass the Po had been fruitless, retired in the night of the 13th from his position, and on the 16th quitted Bologna also. He was followed by the advanced guard of the Austrians under General Stahremberg.

The divisions of Livron and Pignatelli Strongoli had unaccountably retreated without any loss or engagement with the Austrians, who reocupied Florence on the 15th of April. This gave a death-blow to the prospect of success, and the King of Naples determined on retiring within the frontiers of his own territory: he retreated successively to Faenza, Forli, and Cesena on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, on which latter day Ambrosio's division was harassed in its retreat from Ravenna to Cesenatico, by the garrison of Commachio.

The result of these operations gave General Frimont the command of the great road to

Florence; his army was now greatly superior in numbers to that of the King of Naples, and he was enabled to detach the second corps under General Bianchi towards Florence, directing him from thence upon Foligno, to endeavour to get in rear of the Neapolitans, whose direct retreat upon Naples would thus be cut off. The first corps, under General Niepperg, was directed to pursue the retreat of Murat on the great road towards Ancona, and by harassing the enemy, to retard their march, and favour the movement of Bianchi's corps.

Murat, who had placed too much confidence in the strength of the divisions of Livron and Pignatelli Strongoli, retired slowly, checking the pursuit on the Ronco and the Savio: on the 24th he concentrated near Rimini, having his rear guard at Savignano; from this position he was pursued to Pesaro and Fano, where the Austrian advanced guard arrived on the 29th. A rear guard of Carascosa's division had been posted at Somaglia, where it was attacked on the 1st of May, and in the night the Neapolitans retired on the Ancona road.

Meantime the 2d Austrian corps, under General Bianchi, had reached Florence on the

20th, Arezzo on the 23d, Perugia on the 25th, and Foligno on the 26th; so that Murat, now finding his direct retreat on Naples intercepted, endeavoured to gain the great road by the way of Macerata and Tolentino, leaving Carascosa to check the advance of Niepperg: Bianchi with his corps marched upon Tolentino to cut off the retreat of Murat, and having arrived in time, took up a position in front of that town, having his right flank resting on the valley and river of Chienti, and his left upon that of Potenza.

The King of Naples posted his army, which was now reinforced by the greater part of the troops under Livron and Pignatelli Strongoli, on the height of Monte Milone, about midway between Macerata and Tolentino. On the 2d of May he attacked the right of the Austrians, and was driven back, and on the 3d renewed his attempt on the side of the great road, whilst the divisions of Ambrosio and Pignatelli descended from Monte Milone to attack the left. About 8,000 Neapolitans were formed in squares of two battalions each, and descending from the mountain, boldly advanced against the Austrians through a heavy fire of artillery and musketry: this attack was met by the Austrians, formed in two lines, and supported by cavalry,

which made a conversion, and turned the right flank of the Neapolitans. This disposition succeeded in repelling the attack, and General Mohr, on the right wing, having also repulsed the enemy, General Bianchi ordered the advance of columns by the valleys on both flanks to threaten the rear of the position of Monte Milone, and the King, hearing that Niepperg's corps was already marching by Jesi to turn his rear, was obliged to retreat; his loss was severe, many of his superior officers had fallen or been severely wounded; disaffection and treason had sorely thinned his ranks; and, notwithstanding the constant example of his personal bravery, he was unable to stem the tide of misfortunes which, in rapid succession, followed this disaster.

In this disorganized state, the Neapolitan army was obliged to seek safety in a retreat by the bad roads along the coast of the Adriatic. General Mohr, with a part of the Austrian forces, pursued them: he passed the Tronto on the 8th; occupied Benedetto on the 9th; and on the 12th, having left a part of his troops to blockade Pescara, marched with the remainder on Popoli.

General Bianchi, with the main Austrian army, now composed of the first and second corps, proceeded by the Foligno road towards Terni; he was at Spoleto on the 9th, then crossing the mountains by Terni and Rieti, arrived on the 12th at Aquila. The castle of Aquila had surrendered to an Austrian detachment sent in advance, and Bianchi proceeded on his march to Popoli and Sulmona. The Neapolitans had already passed the defiles of the mountains in a most disorganized state, being reduced by various losses to about 15,000 men.

Meanwhile General Nugent had continued his march from Florence upon Rome, where he arrived on the 30th of April. From Rome he marched towards Ceprano, in the neighbourhood of which place, partial engagements of little interest took place, with armed bands of mountaineers, under General Montigni. General Nugent then proceeded to Terracina, Fondi, and Pontecorvo, and at St. Germano he was met by the King of Naples, who with a body of men armed for the internal defence of the kingdom, attempted to check his progress; but columns being sent to cut off the retreat of the Neapolitans, obliged them on the 16th to quit this position.

From hence to Naples the pursuit was unrelaxed, and in the neighbourhood of Calvi, where the great roads leading to Naples meet, the Austrian armies united. Murat with his forces had occupied Capua, but all hopes of saving his capital being at an end, he privately entered Naples on the 19th. To contribute to the disasters of his downfall, an English squadron had appeared in front of the town, and, under the threat of a bombardment, took possession of the Neapolitan ships of war, naval stores, &c. The Duke of Gallo had been sent to treat with the allies, and the consequence of his interview with them was, an armistice and capitulation, by which, on the 22d of May, the Austrian troops took possession of the capital. Murat had already embarked in a small boat, and proceeded to Ischia, where he was afterwards joined by the Duke of Rocca Romana, and both set sail for France.

The result of the campaign in Italy, besides restoring King Ferdinand to his throne, was the liberation of the greater part of the Austrian army, and it now began to assemble in great force in Lombardy, whither General Frimont had been sent to take the command, prior to the battle of Tolentino.

We now turn to the preparations for war made by the allied sovereigns, and the means of defence resorted to by Napoleon.

It has been before stated, that it was calculated that by the end of May near 500,000 troops might be collected on the French frontier. This force may be estimated in round numbers as follows:

Russians, . .	160,000
Austrians, . .	80,000
Prussians, . .	120,000
Anglo Belgian army,	75,000
Bavarian, Wurtemberg, Hesse, &c.	65,000

Making a total of nearly 500,000 men, besides the Austro Italian army, which, after the campaign against Murat, assembled in Lombardy, for the purpose of invading the south of France.

Nothing could exceed the activity displayed by the allies in their preparations for the approaching contest; each power seemed to vie with its neighbour in the promptitude and good order in which its reinforcements arrived at their several stations; and in the beginning of

June the armies of the allies were composed and stationed in the following order.

ARMY OF THE NETHERLANDS,
COMMANDED BY F. M. H. G. THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

This army was divided into two corps and a reserve, viz.

INFANTRY.

The 1st corps, commanded by General H. R. H. the Prince of Orange, consisting of the

1st English division (guards)
3d do.
1st Hanoverian brigade
2d division of the Netherlands
3d do. do.

with a proportionate force of artillery, occupied Enghien, Braine le Comte, Nivelles, and Soignies.

Second corps, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill, consisting of the

2d English division
4th do. do.
3d Hanoverian brigade
6th do. do.
1st division of the Netherlands
Indian brigade of ditto (a brigade raised for service in the Dutch colonies)

with a proportionate force of artillery, occupied Ath, Lens, Oudenarde, Grammont, and the places adjacent.

THE RESERVE,

consisting of the

5th English division
6th do. do.
4th Hanoverian brigade
5th do. do.

with a numerous artillery, occupied Ghent, Bruxelles, and the neighbourhood.

The Cavalry attached to this army, commanded by Lieut.-General the Earl of Uxbridge, and consisting of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, English brigades, and the 1st Hanoverian brigade, were chiefly stationed about Grammont and Ninove.

It must be observed, that in the above statement, the troops of the King's German Legion are included in the brigade and divisions of the English army.

The whole force of this army, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, probably amounted to 75,000 men, viz.

		CAVALRY.		
English 5807	King's German Legion 2528	Hanoverians 1135	Total 9470	
		INFANTRY.		
English 19,367	King's German Legion 3494	Hanoverians 12,090	Total 34,951	
		ARTILLERY.		
English 4094	King's German Legion 586	—— ——	Total 4680	
		STAFF.		
English 1400	(including waggon train, engineers, &c.)		1400	
Making English 30,668	King's German Legion 6608	Hanoverians 13,225	Total 50,501	

To this force must be added the 7th British brigade, which, together with two veteran battalions, amounted to (suppose) 2500 men; and the Belgian, Brunswick, and Nassau troops may be stated at 22,000 men: we have therefore

50,501 English, K. G. L. and Hanoverians;
2500 of the 7th brigade; and
22,000 Belgian, Brunswick, and Nassau.

Making 75,001 men.

The fortresses from Mons to the sea were garrisoned chiefly by Hanoverian and Dutch troops, which formed part of the divisions included in the two corps of the army and of the reserve.

PRUSSIAN ARMY OF THE LOWER RHINE, COMMANDED BY F. M. H. H. PRINCE BLUCHER.

This army was composed of four corps, distributed in the following order:

The 1st corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Ziethen, consisted of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th brigades. This corps occupied Fontaine

L'Evesque, Fleurus, and Charleroy, having out-posts established at Thuin and Lobes, on the Sambre, in observation of the French frontier.

The 2d corps, commanded by Major-General Pirch, consisted of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th brigades. It was distributed in Namur, and all the surrounding villages.

The 3d corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Thielmann, and consisting of the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th brigades, was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Ciney.

The 4th corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Bulow, consisting of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th brigades, were assembled around Hannut.

Four corps of cavalry, and a proportionate force of artillery with reserves, completed this army, which amounted to near 120,000 men.

The line of separation between this army and that of the Netherlands was the old Roman road leading from Bavay to Tongres.

AUSTRIAN ARMY OF THE RHINE,
COMMANDED BY F. M. PRINCE SCHWARTZENBURG,

was assembling on the banks of the Rhine, and around Heidelberg, on the Neckar, where the head-quarters were established on the 2d of June. This army consisted of near 50,000 men, and with the army of reserve, amounting to 40,000, commanded by the Archduke Ferdinand, whose head-quarters were at Fribourg, made a force of nearly 90,000 Austrians, assembled on the right bank of the Rhine, between Basle and Manheim.

THE BAVARIAN ARMY,
COMMANDED BY PRINCE WREDE,

and the troops of Baden and Wurtemberg, commanded by the hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg, together with the troops of Hesse, guarded the banks of the Rhine, from the tête-de-pont of Germersheim to Rastadt. Some of the light troops of these corps had already passed the river, to keep in check the outposts of the enemy. The amount of these contingents was probably about 65,000 men.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY,
COMMANDED BY F. M. BARCLAY DE TOLLY,

and amounting to 160,000 men, had been gra-

dually approaching the Rhine; and at this period its columns were rapidly passing through Nuremberg and Bamberg, and directing their march through Aschaffenbourg and Bischofsheim, towards Manheim.

On the 5th of June the Emperor of Russia, with all his staff, and three regiments of cossacks of the guard, arrived at Heidelberg, and on the 12th 10,000 Russians, with a considerable park of artillery, arrived in the vicinity of Manheim: these were soon followed by others, and at the commencement of hostilities, Prince Schwartzenburg had 30,000 Russians attached to his army.

THE AUSTRO ITALIAN ARMY,
COMMANDED IN CHIEF BY BARON FRIMONT,

consisted of three corps of Austrians.

The 1st corps, under General Baron Frimont	60,000
2d corps, under Count Bubna .	35,000
To this corps were attached of Piedmontese	15,000
3d corps, under General Bianchi	30,000

The two former of these corps assembled in the plains of Lombardy. The latter was,

in great part, embarked at Naples, and landed at Genoa, whence, together with a small English corps under Lord W. Bentinck, it proceeded towards Monaco.

In this manner the allied armies formed an almost uninterrupted chain from the coast of Flanders to the shores of the Mediterranean, exhibiting in Belgium, on the Rhine, and on the Italian frontier, forces sufficiently strong to cope, independently, with the whole disposable army which France might bring against any one of them.

Notwithstanding these formidable preparations of the allies, the activity displayed by the French government in organizing the means of defence, the rapid reinforcement of the army, its admirable classification, and the excellent adaptation of each arm to its appropriate service, enabled Napoleon to bring forward a much greater disposable force of regular troops than might have been supposed, and indicated a strength and determination which might render the contest long and severe, and even its result doubtful.

The alterations which had been made in the

French army during the short period of the King's residence in the capital were annulled, and the veteran legions of Napoleon resumed their ancient organization. The soldiers, with feelings of transport, welcomed the return of those banners which were identified with their dearest interests, and with the memory of their bravest achievements: ambition for military fame may, indeed, be said to have become the most prominent feature in the character of a nation where the youth were trained up in the love of glory from the cradle to manhood. The appeal to arms was, therefore, answered by the enrolment of nearly the whole male population of France. The revolts excited by the partizans of the Bourbons, in the valleys of the Rhone, the Garonne, and the Loire, were easily quelled; and the authority of Napoleon was established over every part of the empire. Armies were formed and stationed along the whole frontier, and prior to the commencement of hostilities, the several corps of the Regular Army, and of the Armies of Observation, were disposed in the following order:

ARMÉE DE FLANDRE.

The 1st corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Count D'Erlon, consisted of four divisions of infantry, one division of light cavalry, five batteries of foot, and one of horse artillery, with reserves, and was assembled at Lille and in its environs.

This corps formed a part of the army of the North, or, as it was called, of the *Armée de Flandre.* The force of this corps, including the reserves, may be stated at 34,000 men.

The 2d corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Count Reille, consisted of four divisions of infantry, one division of light cavalry, five batteries of foot, and one of horse artillery, with reserves, and was assembled around Valenciennes. This corps also formed part of the *Armée de Flandre*, and its force, including reserves, amounted to 36,000 men.

The 3d corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Count Vandamme, consisted of three divisions of infantry, one division of light cavalry, four batteries of foot, and one of horse artillery, with reserves, and was collected around Mézieres. The strength of this corps, which also

formed part of the *Armée de Flandre*, amounted to 26,000 men.

The 4th corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Count Gérard, consisted of three divisions of infantry, one division of light and heavy cavalry, four batteries of foot, and one of horse artillery, with reserves, and was assembled at Metz and in its environs. This corps formed the basis of an army called the ARMY OF THE MOSELLE, but its position facilitated its junction either with the corps upon its left, or with the troops in Alsace: its force may be estimated at 24,000 men.

The 5th corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Count Rapp, consisting of three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and six batteries of artillery, with strong reserves, was assembled at Strasbourg, and occupied all the neighbouring towns on the left bank of the Rhine. This corps formed the basis of the ARMY OF THE RHINE: its force amounted to 23,000 men.

The 6th corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Mouton, Count of Lobau, consisted of three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and five batteries of artillery: it was assembling in

the environs of Laon, and may be estimated, with its reserves, at 27,000 men. This corps formed the reserve to the *Armée de Flandre* or army of the North.

The 7th corps, commanded by Marshal Suchet, consisting of two divisions of infantry of the line, two of national guards (*d'élite*), and a mixed division of foreign troops, together with one division of light cavalry, and three batteries of artillery, was concentrated around Chambery: its force may be estimated at upwards of 36,000 men. Its object was to guard this part of the frontier, and to cover the approach towards Lyons.

FOUR CORPS OF CAVALRY,

commanded in chief by Marshal Count Grouchy, were attached to those of the above-named corps, forming the *Armée de Flandre*. They were the following:

The 1st corps of cavalry, commanded by Lieut.-General Count Pajol, consisting of one division of hussars, one of lancers and chasseurs, with two batteries of horse artillery, was assembled in the country between the Aisne and the northern frontier: its strength was of 3900 men.

The 2d corps of cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-General Excelmans, consisted of two divisions of dragoons, with two batteries of horse artillery, and amounted to 3800 men.

The 3d corps of cavalry, commanded by Lieut.-General Kellermann, Count de Valmy, consisted of two divisions formed of dragoons and cuirassiers, and with two batteries of horse artillery amounted to 5000 men.

The 4th corps of cavalry, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Count Milhaud, consisted of two divisions, all cuirassiers, and amounted to 4500 men.

Besides these seven corps of infantry and four corps of cavalry of the line, corps of observation, formed partly of troops of the line, and partly of national guards, were assembled upon different parts of the frontier. They were as follows:

ARMIES OF OBSERVATION.

The 1st corps of observation (of the Jura), commanded by Lieut.-General Lecourbe, consisted of one division of infantry of the line,

part of a division of reserve, and a division of national guards (*d'élite*), with five batteries of artillery, amounting together to 17,800 men, was assembled around Befort, and guarded the passes of the Doubs and Jura: its right wing communicated with the seventh *corps d'armée*, under Marshal Suchet, and its left with the right of Gen. Rapp's corps in Alsace.

A franc corps of the Jura was also raised to defend the passes of Morteau, Jougne, les Rousses, and les Faucilles.

The 2d corps of observation (of the Var), commanded by Marshal Brune, consisting of one division of infantry of the line, and one of national guards of the Dauphiny, with a corps of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery, amounting together to 16,900 men, was assembled around Antibes, and was intended to guard the frontier of the Maritime Alps.

The 3d corps of observation (of the eastern Pyrennees), commanded by Lieut.-General Delaborde, consisted of one division of infantry of the line, one division of national guards (*d'élite*), one of the national guards of Languedoc, a small body of cavalry, with three batteries of

artillery, amounting to 22,500 men, were formed in Toulouse and the neighbouring districts.

The 4th corps of observation (of the western Pyrennees, or of the Gironde) commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Clauzel, consisting of one division of infantry of the line, one of national guards (*d'élite*), and one of national guards of Gascony, with a small body of cavalry, and four batteries of artillery, making together a force of 23,000 men, was concentrated round Bourdeaux.

The 5th corps of observation, or army of La Vendée, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Travot, was formed of part of the troops of all the other corps excepting the 7th; of a part of the young guard; and of a very strong body of gendarmes, &c. &c.; with seven batteries of artillery, making together a force of 20,000 men. This force was actively employed in quelling the disturbances and revolts in la Vendée.

Thus a regular army of 224,200 men, formed into seven corps; and armies of observation, amounting to 100,200 men; making together a disposable force of 324,400 men, guarded the frontiers of the empire, besides THE IMPERIAL GUARDS, the *élite* of the whole French army,

which were formed around Paris, consisting of three divisions of infantry, two divisions of cavalry, with strong reserves, and a large train of artillery, and amounting together to upwards of 30,000 men.

It must be observed, that the strength of those of the above named corps and of the imperial guard, which invaded Belgium, was not near so great as above stated; many being left in garrisons or detached on other services, and the reader is referred to the* special table of the forces which invaded Belgium, for an account of their composition and strength.

The forces which were raised for local defence, in national guards, coast guards, &c., may be estimated with tolerable accuracy, in round numbers, at 375,600. Hence we have,

The disposable force of	224,200 (troops of the line)
With the *corps d'armées* of observation of	100,200 (part of the line)
The imperial guard of	30,000 (all disposable)
The national guards, &c.	375,600 *(troupes immobiles)*

Making together a total of 730,000 effective men for the defence of the empire.

See Appendix, No. V.

Paris and Lyons were fixed upon as two great centrepoints of resistance, around which, in the event of invasion, the different armies of the north and south were to rally. They were strongly fortified, and the different positions between the frontier and those capitals were intrenched. The fortresses along the whole line of frontier were placed in a respectable state of defence, and there was every appearance that the enemy would make the most determined resistance. Many of the most experienced officers were of opinion that Napoleon, contrary to the usual character of his tactics, would adopt this mode of warfare; but the brilliant prospect of defeating a part of the allied forces, by boldly carrying the war out of the French territory, and thus destroying the projected system of their combined efforts, was preferred. The allied forces were now formidably strong, and they were daily joined by fresh reinforcements; the delay therefore of a few days might destroy this chance of success, as it seemed probable that they themselves would in a short time become the assailants. Orders were therefore expedited for the assembly of the army of the north; but it did not appear that there was any particular point of concentration

until after the seventh of June, on which day Caulincourt made his *exposé* on the state of the nation, and represented the immediate commencement of hostilities as the only means of securing the independence of France. From this time we may date the commencement of the campaign: the French army began to make important movements, and on the 10th it was concentrating in the following positions:

The first corps at Valenciennes,
The second corps at Maubeuge,
The third corps between Marienbourg and Chimay,
The fourth corps at Rocroy,
The sixth corps at Avesnes,
The imperial guard between Soissons and Laon.

The four corps of cavalry were distributed among the different corps of infantry on the banks of the Sambre.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 12th of June, Napoleon left Paris to join the army. He passed through Soissons, and arrived at Laon at six in the evening, immediately mounted his horse, made the tour of the city and ramparts,

and at eight retired to the hotel of the prefecture, where he slept. On the following day he proceeded to Avesnes, and remained there on the 13th. On the 14th, at ten o'clock in the morning, he mounted his horse and rode to Beaumont; and the same day, the anniversary of the battles of Marengo and Friedland, issued his proclamation* to the army, which on that day occupied the following positions†:

The first corps at Solre sur Sambre,
Second corps at Ham sur Heure,
Third corps in front of Beaumont,
Fourth corps in front of Philippeville,
Sixth corps in front of Beaumont,
The imperial guard around Beaumont,
The four corps of cavalry, under Marshal Grouchy, between Beaumont and Walcourt.
The imperial head-quarters at Beaumont.

At length the moment for active operations was arrived: Napoleon, about one o'clock in the morning of the 15th, appeared at his balcony, in company with his brother Jerome: he seemed anxiously to examine the state of the weather,

* See Appendix, No. VI.

† For the orders of the day, see Appendix Nos. VII. and VIII.

which was of material importance to the success of his enterprise, where his cavalry, formed into one body for the express purpose, were suddenly to penetrate into the plains of Belgium, and if possible effect a separation of the English and Prussian forces, and thus give an opportunity of beating them in detail. At three o'clock the whole army was in movement. The 2d corps, supported by the 1st, was directed to march upon Marchiennes, to drive in the Prussian outposts at Thuin and Lobes, and to ensure the communications across the Sambre between those places. The 3d corps, supported by the 1st corps of cavalry under Gen. Pajol, was directed to march upon Charleroi: these were to be followed by the 6th corps and the imperial guard; detachments of marines and engineers, with materials for the prompt repair of the bridge, accompanied the head of the column.—Marshal Grouchy, with the three remaining corps of cavalry, was also directed to march upon Charleroi by the cross roads to the right and left of the 3d and 6th corps.—The 4th corps was ordered to proceed from its bivouac in front of Philippeville direct upon Chastelet.

The French advanced guards almost imme-

diately came in contact with the Prussian outposts, and a continued skirmish was kept up during the whole morning: the Prussians, vainly endeavouring to hold their ground against superior numbers, lost a good many men, chiefly of the 28th and 29th regiments, who were taken prisoners by the French cavalry.—The extent of frontier which Gen. Ziethen's corps had to cover rendered it impossible for him to oppose an adequate force to check the advance of the enemy; he, therefore, continued his retreat through Charleroi towards Fleurus, opposing however the advance of the French wherever the ground would admit, in order to give time for the assembly of the Prussian army under Marshal Blucher. The several corps of the French army advanced in the order directed, but, owing to the difficulties of the cross roads, much time was lost, and it was near mid-day before the debouche from Charleroi was secured. The second corps now passed the Sambre at Marchienne-au-pont, whilst Gen. Pajol with the 1st corps of cavalry entered Charleroi.—Gen. Clary drove the Prussians from the heights above the town, and patrolled the great Bruxelles road as far as Gosselies, whilst Pajol advanced upon Gilly on the road to Namur. Gen. Ziethen had occupied a position with a part of his

corps on a height immediately behind Gilly, at the entrance to a wood which extends from that place nearly to Fleurus.—Napoleon, having placed the imperial guard in a position on the height covering the approach to Charleroi, near the junction of the roads from Brussels and Fleurus, advanced to Gilly, accompanied by his four squadrons* of the guard then on service about his person.—A part of the third corps under Vandamme now coming up, he directed an attack of infantry through the village, whilst General Letort, with the squadrons of service, went round to attack the flank of the Prussians. A few pieces of artillery were placed on the height behind Gilly, and at about half past two an engagement took place. About eight battalions of the Prussians formed squares to resist the attack of cavalry under General Letort, whose impetuosity carried all before them, and the 28th and 29th Prussian regiments again suffered considerable loss: this compelled General Ziethen to retreat upon

* The squadrons of service were those on duty for the day, and consisted of

One squadron of dragoons of the guard,
One squadron of grenadiers-à-cheval of the guard,
One squadron of chasseurs-à-cheval of the guard,
And one squadron of lanciers rouge of the guard.

Fleurus, where he took up a position for the night. In the afternoon, Marshal Ney had arrived at the head-quarters; he was immediately entrusted by Napoleon with the command of the left wing of the army, and directed to overthrow all resistance, and establish himself in position at Quatre Bras, the point where the road leading from Charleroi to Brussels is intersected by that leading from Nivelles to Namur. The Emperor had sent the cavalry of the guard under Lefebvre Desnouettes, and the 2d corps of cavalry under General Excelmanns, to support the movement of General Clary on the Brussels road; meanwhile the 2d corps of infantry, under Reille, advanced by the cross roads from Marchienne-au-pont to Gosselies, and its movement was followed by that of the 1st corps under D'Erlon. That part of Ziethen's corps which had been cantoned about Fontaine l'Evesque retreated by Gosselies, and thence along the Roman road towards Fleurus: it was pursued by the 3d division of the 2d corps, commanded by Baron Girard*. The remainder of the 2d corps marched towards

* As this division under Baron Girard was separated from its corps, and engaged at the battle of Ligny, we must be careful not to confound the name with that of the commander of the 4th corps d'armée, the Count Gérard.

Frasne, where, at five o'clock, it was met by the troops of Nassau, commanded by Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who succeeded in maintaining his position near Quatre Bras, against the feeble attacks of the enemy; and in this manner secured the important communication with the great road from Nivelles. In this state the events of the day closed.

We shall here offer a few remarks on this preparatory operation of the campaign.

It has been before stated that the object of the manœuvres of the day was to effectuate a separation of, and to interpose a corps between, the English and Prussian forces; and it is manifest from the result how very nearly this object had been accomplished, and there seemed every prospect that the enemy might succeed in this object even on the following day, owing to the wide extended cantonments occupied by the allies. The plan proposed was, indisputably, excellent, and the mode in which the French army had been assembled around Beaumont admirably executed, without exciting the suspicion of an immediate attack, on the part of the allies; but we will venture to assert, that, far from being taken by surprise

from the attack being made on this point, it was the most probable, if not the only rational line of operation which Napoleon could have adopted. The allied generals were fully aware that the French army was making preparations to invade Belgium, and the line of operation chosen was unquestionably the most favourable for the attempt. It was the most direct line to Brussels, and not a single fort or redoubt had been constructed to check an advance along it: it was, besides, almost exactly the line of separation between the English and Prussian armies; and the nature of the country, expanding into open plains of corn fields, was well suited to the deployment of cavalry, and the French were greatly superior in this arm. It was probably through a knowledge of all these circumstances that the Duke of Wellington foresaw the necessity of having his reserve on a point which could not be taken by surprise, and which, by its position, could be moved with the least delay to the point attacked, and thus assist in checking the progress of the enemy, whilst the English on the one hand, and the Prussians on the other, should concentrate and occupy a position to cover the approach to the Flemish capital. These plans so precisely accorded with the events which afterwards occurred, that

we cannot offer a better refutation of the erroneous opinions now abroad on this point, than the simple consideration of the facts. In the French accounts of the campaign, much blame has been given to Marshal Ney for not occupying Quatre Bras with all his force on the evening of the 15th, as, with the three divisions of the second corps under Reille, with the whole of the second corps of cavalry under Excelmans, and with that of the imperial guard under Lefebvre Desnouettes, he had certainly quite sufficient troops to have overthrown all resistance which could be made upon this point: and, if we may be allowed to hazard an opinion, he might have advanced his outposts of cavalry as far as Genappe, on the Brussels road, and Hautain, on that leading to Nivelles. This would, at all events, have compelled the English army to have chosen some more distant place of assembly than Quatre Bras; and, in the event of his not being able to maintain these advanced outposts, much delay might have been given to the English army by contesting the ground between these places and Quatre Bras, and thus have totally shut out all hopes of succour to the Prussian army, in its position of Ligny, on the 16th of June.

On the night of the 15th of June, the French army remained in the positions stated above, and the Duke of Wellington being now confirmed in his opinion of the principal point of attack, directed the army of the Netherlands to march upon Quatre Bras. The reserve, with the Brunswick contingent, moved early in the morning of the 16th from Bruxelles and its neighbourhood, direct through the forest of Soignes, upon Quatre Bras, and the main body of the army marched laterally, parallel with the frontier, from its cantonments towards the same point.—Marshal Blucher had assembled the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps of his army behind Fleurus, and on the morning of the 16th had taken up a position with his right wing upon Bry and his left at Sombref, at the same time occupying in force the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, situated on the Ligne, a rivulet which runs along the front of the position, in the direction of Sombref. These villages, and that of Ligny in particular, are well adapted for defence, being formed chiefly of well-built farm houses, with quadrangular courts, formed by the stables and other out-buildings attached to them: the Prussians loop-holed the walls, and each house became a petty fortress.

On the night of the 15th Napoleon had slept at Charleroi, and early on the 16th issued orders for the operations of his army.—Marshal Grouchy, with the right wing, was directed to march by the right of Fleurus upon Sombref*, and to occupy a position there with the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps of cavalry; he was also directed to unite under his orders the 4th corps d'armée, under Gérard†; and the 3d corps under Vandamme†. The corps of Gérard was ordered also to march by the right of Fleurus, whilst that under Vandamme was to proceed by the great road through that town. The imperial guard were moved from Charleroi, and about mid-day arrived by the great road on the plain of Fleurus, in support of the 3d and 4th corps. The 6th corps was left in reserve at Charleroi, ready to be moved upon Quatre Bras or Fleurus, as the events of the day might require, and it was not till late in the afternoon that this corps was directed upon Fleurus, too late however to be of service in the action which took place. Marshal Ney, with the left wing, was directed to march upon Quatre Bras‡,

* See Appendix, No. IX.

† See Appendix, Nos. X. and XI.

‡ See Appendix, Nos. XII. and XIII.

uniting under his orders the 2d corps d'armée under Reille, with the exception of the division of General Girard, with the whole of the 3d corps of cavalry under Kellermann, and to overthrow all opposition: he was to be supported in this movement by the 1st corps d'armée, under Count d'Erlon, which had not then arrived on the position of Frasnes. The light cavalry of the imperial guard, under Lefebvre Desnouettes, was ordered to remain in rear of Frasnes to await further orders. The division Girard, of Reille's corps, which had pursued the Prussians in their retreat on the former day in the direction of Fleurus, remained in bivouac that night near Wagnele, and on the 16th was retained to co-operate with Vandamme's corps, in its attack on the village of St. Amand.

BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.

The enemy commenced the operations of the 16th by attacking the troops of the Netherlands, which had been assembled by the Prince of Orange in a position covering the approach to Quatre Bras from Frasnes.—The troops assembled on this point were, part of the 2d division of the Netherlands, under General Per-

poncher, whilst the 3d division of the Netherlands, under General Collaert, and the 1st and 3d English divisions, were ordered to march by Nivelles towards the scene of action. The skirmishing commenced at five o'clock in the morning, and continued till mid-day without any decisive movement being made: the troops of the Netherlands, however, being unsupported, began to cede their ground to the superior numbers of the enemy, when Sir Thomas Picton, with the 5th English division, consisting of the 8th British brigade under Sir James Kemp, and the 9th British brigade under Sir Dennis Pack, with the 5th Hanoverian brigade under Colonel Vinche, opportunely arrived to their support, about two o'clock, together with the Brunswick contingent, and almost immediately entered into action. Sir J. Kemp's brigade, consisting of the 28th, 32d, 79th, and 95th regiments were moved to the left of the position with the 3d battalion of the royals, forming part of the brigade of Sir D. Pack, who with the remainder of his brigade, consisting of the 42d, 44th, and 92d regiments, formed on the great Namur road, and in the corn fields extending to the Bois de Bossu on the right: the 92d were formed in

line in the ditch bordering the great road, and were of the greatest service in repelling an attack of the French cavalry, who daringly pursued the Brunswick hussars into the British line, after they had made an unsuccessful attack on the French cavalry.

The enemy moved down two divisions of infantry supported by cavalry, with intent to force the centre of the British position; their approach was covered by a galling fire of round and grape shot, but the determined courage of the allies withstood this fierce attack; and after a destructive fire in line, the troops formed squares to resist the French cavalry who were now rapidly advancing, and although barely sufficient time was given for a regular formation to receive them, they succeeded in repelling this attempt, which unfortunately caused severe loss to some of the regiments engaged.

The third English division, under General Alten, consisting of the 5th British brigade under Sir C. Halket; the 2d brigade of the king's German legion, under Colonel Ompteda; and the 1st Hanoverian brigade, under Gen. Kielmansegge; arrived next on the field, in time to sustain a fresh attack, made by the enemy

about four o'clock. Strong columns attacked the right of the allied position, and endeavoured to obtain possession of the Bois de Bossu and out-buildings in front of Quatre Bras: the action became very severe, the enemy, with a greatly superior force of artillery, poured a most destructive fire on the 3d division, which had great difficulty in sustaining its ground: the 5th brigade, consisting of the 30th, 33d, 69th, and 73d regiments, suffered great loss, especially the 33d and 69th, whose ranks, weakened by the enemy's artillery, were inadequate to resist the daring attacks of the French cavalry, and the 33d effected its retreat into the Bois de Bossu. At this critical juncture, when the enemy had almost succeeded in establishing his light troops on the great road of Nivelles, the 1st English division, under General Cooke, consisting of the 1st brigade of guards under Major-General Maitland, and the 2d brigade of guards under Major-General Byng, with Captain Sandham's and Major Kuhlman's brigades of artillery, arrived about half past six o'clock on the field of action, after a fatiguing march from their cantonments around Enghien.

Tired as the men were, no time was to be lost; and Major-General Maitland's brigade,

consisting of the 2d and 3d battalions of the 1st regiment of guards, immediately formed line, and, cheering, entered the wood. The 3d battalion, under Colonel Stuart, was on the right; the 2d, under Colonel Askew, on the left; and the gallant style in which they charged through the Bois de Bossu swept all before them, and in a few minutes the enemy was completely driven out of it: the intricacy of the wood, however, broke the line of guards, and when they advanced from the opposite side of it their formation was very irregular; they found immediately in their front a well-formed line of French infantry, who instantly engaged them; the guards however pursued their success and were driving the French up the rising ground opposite, a destructive fire being kept up on both sides, when the enemy's cavalry, seeing the guards unsupported, and their irregular formation, suddenly formed on the heights, and made a rapid charge with a view of relieving their infantry; but General Maitland, perceiving their intention, ordered the immediate retreat of the guards to the wood, as all attempts at forming squares would have been in vain. On gaining the wood, they immediately formed along its skirts, and opened a most destructive fire on the French cavalry, which now retreated

in the greatest disorder, leaving many killed on the ground: again the guards sallied from the wood, and again the same scene took place: a column of Brunswick infantry now came up along the fields skirting the wood, and on a fresh charge of the French cavalry, formed a sort of fleche, or two sides of a square, with the salient angle towards the enemy, and were of great use in covering the retreat of the guards into the wood. Night was now fast approaching, and the enemy having failed in this, as in his former efforts, retired to his position on the heights in front of Frasnes, leaving the allies in possession of the field of battle. Strong outposts were established in front of the whole line, and the troops bivouacked in the plains which their bravery has immortalized. An object so important as the command of this position, which secured the means of communication with the Prussian army, was only to be attained by the most resolute courage; the enemy using his utmost efforts for this purpose against the allies, whose want of cavalry, and comparatively small force of artillery, gave him every advantage.—The loss was consequently very severe, and many of the bravest officers fell in the contest. The Duke of Brunswick was killed at the head of his troops;

the gallant Colonel Macarra, of the 42d, was severely wounded, and whilst some of his men were conveying him to the rear, a party of the French cavalry rode up and killed him and his faithful attendants.—Colonel Cameron of the 92d fell whilst bravely leading on his regiment, and in the latter part of the day, Colonels Askew and Stuart, and Colonel Townsend, next in command, were all severely wounded whilst conducting the last decisive attack of the guards, which closed the events of the day on this side. The artillery, notwithstanding its numerical inferiority to that of the enemy, displayed great superiority in the admirable precision of its fire; indeed one attack made by the French cuirassiers, who charged down the great chaussée to Quatre Bras, was repulsed solely by a well directed volley from a battery posted on the little rising ground close to the intersection of the roads; they reserved their fire till the enemy were within a few paces of the guns, when a discharge of grape shot strewed the ground with dead and wounded, and compelled the remainder to retreat precipitately. Only a small body of English cavalry arrived on the scene of action, but the evening was too far advanced for it to take part in the contest. The German legion and Hanoverian brigades displayed great steadi-

ness, and were of the most essential service in driving the enemy from the woods and villages on the left of the position; which in reality was the most essential point for the enemy to become master of, as he might then have effectually co-operated in the movements of Napoleon against the Prussian army near Fleurus, and the operations on that side will now be described.

BATTLE OF LIGNY.

We have already observed that Marshal Blucher had assembled three corps of his army behind the Ligne, on the heights between Bry and Sombref. The following is the order in which these corps were distributed at the commencement of the action, which took place on the 16th of June.

The 1st corps, under Lieut.-Gen. Ziethen, occupied with its 1st brigade, under Gen. Heinmetz, the whole of the village of great St. Amand, on the right bank of the Ligne; with its 3d brigade, under Gen. Sagow, the village of little St. Amand, situated between great St. Amand and Wagnele; with its fourth brigade, under Gen. Henkel, the large village of Ligny on both banks of the rivulet; the 2d brigade remained in reserve to the other three

on the heights near Bry; the reserve cavalry of this corps, under Gen. Roeder, was drawn up on the heights immediately behind great St. Amand; the artillery was chiefly placed in battery on the height between St. Amand and Ligny, so as to flank with its fire both of these villages, in the event of their being attacked.

The four brigades of the 2d corps, under Major-Gen. Pirch, were drawn up in columns on the heights behind Bry, with their right wing, formed by the 5th brigade, under Gen. Tippelskirk, resting on Bry; their left, formed by the 8th brigade, under Col. Langen, upon Sombref; their right centre, consisting of the 7th brigade, under Gen. Brause; and their left centre formed by the 6th brigade under Gen. Kraft. The reserve cavalry of this corps, under Gen. Jurgas, with the artillery, were posted in rear of its right wing.

The 3d corps, under Gen. Thielmann, had its four brigades distributed as follows. The 12th brigade, under Col. Stulpnagel, communicating with the left of the 2d corps, in front of Sombref, with its outposts along the rivulet from Ligny to that village; the 9th brigade, under Gen. Borcke, in the village of Sombref,

and on the Ligne in its front; the 11th brigade, under Col. Leuen, occupied the villages and banks of the Ligne to the left of Sombref; the 10th brigade was in reserve on the heights near the junction of the roads leading from Fleurus and Nivelles to Namur. The reserve cavalry of this corps, under Gen. Hobe, was chiefly in its rear, extending a considerable way along the great Namur road, having its right towards Sombref.

The 4th corps of the Prussian army under Gen. Bulow, was not able to arrive on the scene of action, from its distant cantonments.

The French army arrived early in the morning on the plain of Fleurus, its light troops driving the outposts of the Prussians down into the valley of the Ligne. Napoleon, who now discovered the Prussian army drawn up in the order above stated, immediately conceived the project of cutting off the retreat of a great portion of it, and thus by a decisive advantage over half the troops defending Belgium, he might be enabled to move with his main force against the army of the Netherlands. The exposed situation of the Prussian right wing presented great facilities for its being

turned by part of the troops under Marshal Ney, who in his position of Frasnes was already in some degree in rear of the Prussians, and whom Napoleon supposed had more than adequate forces to repulse the allies from Quatre Bras, and thus be enabled to move with the greater part of his troops directly in rear of the Prussian army. Could this project have been executed, the destruction of the Prussian army would have been inevitable, and near forty thousand prisoners might have been taken; and Napoleon, ever desirous of grasping at the utmost possible advantage which might be gained by his arrangement of battle, decided on attempting it: he therefore directed the corps of infantry and cavalry under Marshal Grouchy to change their front, which till now had been facing Sombref; the right was brought forward towards the Ligne, and the left pivoted upon Fleurus, so that the general direction of the French line became parallel with that of the Prussian army. Napoleon then gave directions for the attack.—Marshal Grouchy, with his right wing *, was to attack Sombref; Gérard, with the centre, the

* It must be observed, that the right wing of the whole French army is here considered as an independent army, and without any reference to the left wing under Marshal Ney.

village of Ligny; and Vandamme, with the left, the village of St. Amand. The division of Gen. Girard, which had been retained here, was to act in support of the left of Vandamme's corps, thus forming the extreme left of the line of battle.—The imperial guards were placed in reserve on the height before Fleurus; orders were sent to expedite the march of the 6th corps, under Count Lobau, upon Fleurus; and an aide-de-camp of Napoleon was sent to Marshal Ney, to inform him of the intended attack upon the Prussians, ordering him at the same time to manœuvre * so as to envelope their rear, and an hour afterwards this order† was reiterated, urging its immediate execution.—Soon after three o'clock the attack commenced by Gen. Le Fol's division of Vandamme's corps moving down on the village of St. Amand, whilst the division of Gen. Girard turned the village by its left and attacked the Prussian infantry posted in the ravine, and in the village of little St. Amand; almost immediately after the corps of Gérard attacked the village of Ligny, the artillery engaged along the whole line, and the battle assumed the most animated character. The French batteries were advantageously

* See Appendix, No. XIV.

† See Appendix, No. XV.

posted on the heights behind the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, and, owing to the long slope of ground on which the Prussian columns were posted, the fire of the French artillery was very destructive, the shot bounding *en ricochet* into the Prussian reserves on the heights. The French reserves were posted under cover of the inequalities of the ground, so that they suffered comparatively less. The enemy succeeding in gaining possession of the village of St. Amand, after a severe conflict, especially about the burial-ground and church, situated on the side nearest to Ligny: the enemy pursued his success by establishing his light troops across the rivulet, and at length was enabled to form on the left bank. The division of Gen. Girard advanced to attack the Prussians, who were now reinforced by the 2d brigade of Gen Ziethen's corps, and a most obstinate engagement ensued; the French endeavouring to force their way up the heights towards Bry, this attempt was supported by part of the corps of Vandamme and by his reserve cavalry; but Marshal Blucher, seeing the impending danger, himself led an attack with two brigades against the enemy, and succeeded in driving back the French troops beyond the ravine. In this sanguinary conflict the French Gen. Girard

was killed, whilst leading on his division: he was esteemed one of the most intrepid and skilful officers in the French army, and his division, following the example of its brave leader, was almost entirely destroyed. The 5th Prussian brigade had meantime been moved down from Bry; it now crossed the ravine near little St. Amand, and endeavoured to act on the flank and rear of Vandamme's corps; but the enemy succeeded in checking their advance, and a combat, without decisive result, was kept up on this side till late in the evening. In the centre the battle was still more obstinate; the French and Prussian troops alternately getting possession of the village of Ligny, and for four hours the firing was unremitted, regiment after regiment being sent to keep up the attack with unabating vigour, till at length, about seven in the evening, the French succeeded in establishing themselves throughout the whole of that part of it situated on the right bank of the rivulet; and by means of the shelter which it afforded, they were enabled to form their columns for passing the rivulet and attacking the Prussians, who were posted in great force on the heights above the village, (called the heights of the mill of Bussy). Marshal Grouchy in the meanwhile was engaged

on the extreme right against the 3d corps of the Prussian army; but this was not the key to the position, and here the combat was less severe. Gen. Thielmann, with a view to turn the rear of the corps of Girard when engaged at Ligny, sent a body of cavalry, with some artillery, by the great road which leads from Sombref towards Fleurus; but they had barely time to deploy and place the guns in battery, when Marshal Grouchy detached a part of his heavy cavalry and charged the Prussians, who retreated in disorder across the ravine, leaving some guns in the enemy's possession. Napoleon, finding that the indecision of Marshal Ney had destroyed his grand project of turning the Prussian right wing, determined on piercing the centre and carrying the position by main force: he ordered the imperial guard to march down to Ligny, and was making preparations for his final attack, when news was brought to him that a corps, supposed to be part of Lord Wellington's force, was in march directly towards the rear of Vandamme's corps; it was soon discovered that this was the 1st corps under Count d'Erlon, who had been informed of the order conveyed to Marshal Ney, directing him to march to the support of Napoleon: Count d'Erlon had consequently moved from the high

road between Gosselies and Frasnes upon the Roman road leading towards Wagnele, and his advance had just come in sight of the field of battle when he received counter-orders from Marshal Ney; who, finding his efforts to drive the English army from its position at Quatre Bras unavailing, began to need support, and immediately sent an order for its return.

Napoleon, now seeing that further delay was useless, formed the columns of attack. The division of General Pecheux, of Gérard's corps, consisting of the 30th, 63d, and 96th regiments, led the attack, by the right of Ligny: it was supported by the two divisions of infantry of the old imperial guard, with the cavalry of the guard, and the divisions of cuirassiers of Generals St. Alphonse and Delort under General Milhaut. This mass of troops advanced up the heights towards the Prussian centre. Marshal Blucher, with his cavalry, made several efforts to check the advance of the enemy; in one of these attempts his horse was killed, and a charge of French cavalry passed over him. In the confusion which ensued he was unnoticed, and the Prussian cavalry had the good fortune to recover their chief, but the French infantry continued to gain ground. The imperial guard

advanced with unshaken firmness, and the division of grenadiers under Count Friant advanced its right, and marched to the left in the direction of the mill of Bussy near Bry. The Prussian cavalry charged them, but they formed squares and repelled the attack. Every part of the Prussian army had been more or less engaged in defending the villages; nearly the whole reserves had been sent to St. Amand, and they now found themselves unable to sustain the overwhelming attacks of the enemy's guards which came fresh into action; the centre of their position was pierced, and retreat became unavoidable. The corps of Ziethen and Pirch fell back upon Tilly, that of Thielman retired late in the night upon Gembloux: rear guards retained possession of Bry and Sombref nearly till dawn of morning of the 17th, the main body of the army having kept its ground till nine o'clock at night.

The following observations naturally arise, from a careful examination of the ground on which the actions of Ligny and Quatre Bras took place, and from a consideration of the movements which were executed by the respective armies during the day.

First, The Prussian army was drawn up in a position with its right wing so exceedingly exposed, that it would seem hardly to warrant Marshal Blucher accepting battle in it, especially as the Duke of Wellington went early in the day to the Prussian position, and, we conclude, as a matter of course, would point out the utter impossibility of his rendering any assistance at this point, owing to the great ditance the British forces had to march before they could arrive at Quatre Bras, and the probable difficulty they might experience in maintaining their ground there against the more numerous columns of the enemy, which were evidently preparing to make a great effort to gain possession of Quatre Bras; and this is the more manifest, as by a glance at the general plan which shows the relative positions of the troops at Quatre Bras and Ligny, we must be convinced that a bold effort, perpendicular either to the right flank of the Prussians, or to the left flank of the English, successful or not, would be the most probable plan the enemy would pursue to effect a separation of the two allied armies, and upon this separation the successful termination of his campaign almost entirely depended.

Second, When Napoleon with the French army arrived at Fleurus, and discovered the exposed situation of the Prussian right wing, and had, at the same time, the certainty that Marshal Ney had more than sufficient forces to keep the advanced guard of Lord Wellington's army in check, it is evident that the most obvious plan to be pursued was to move direct upon Wagnele and Bry, and attack, with all the force he could muster, the Prussian right wing, which was unquestionably the weakest point. For if it be a rule of war to direct the greatest effort against the most important weak point of an enemy; if it be a rule in war to oppose the front of the attacking army obliquely to the flank of an enemy in battle; and, generally, if the merit of a plan "depends on* operating with the greatest mass of forces in a combined effort upon a decisive point," and we believe these rules are undisputed, then it must be allowed that the French commander committed a great fault in tactics in not adopting this mode of attack, which would immediately have obliged the Prussian army to attempt a change of front, confusion would have ensued, and a certain victory have crowned the attempts

* Extract from Jomini.

of the enemy: whereas, in the mode of attack which he chose, the French army sustained severe losses in taking the villages of St. Amand and Ligny; and had not Marshal Blucher been too anxious about his right wing, after the enemy's efforts were become manifest against his centre, and had he retained sufficient reserves on the heights between Bry and Sombref, the last movement of Napoleon, in piercing the centre of the Prussian position, would have led to his certain defeat.

Thus closed the events of the 16th. The French troops, under the immediate orders of Napoleon, bivouacked on the Prussian position of Ligny; those under Marshal Ney on the position of Frasne; whilst the troops under the Duke of Wellington bivouacked on the field of battle of Quatre Bras. With the approach of night the weather became overcast, it was followed by rain, and the cold became severe, but the fatigue which the troops had undergone in their long march and during the action, rendered the approach of night, with all its disadvantages, most enviable.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 17th the troops at Quatre Bras were again called to

arms by the noise of some skirmishing on the outposts; all supposed that the enemy was going to try to effect what he had failed in the day before, but the firing soon ceased. Parties of men were then sent out to collect those of the wounded who had not been removed the former evening, and in this way they were occupied till nine o'clock, when a great change was made in the British line. The Brunswick, Belgium, and Nassau troops, which had been on the left of the Bois de Bossu on the former day, now moved to its right. The first brigade of guards occupied the wood with its light troops, having its reserves in the rear; the 2d brigade of guards occupied the ground contiguous to Quatre Bras; the 3d and 5th English divisions were on their left, extending in front of Sarta Mavelines, and occupying the village of Pierremont with their outposts.—The cavalry, which had arrived on the evening of the 16th, formed line in rear of the whole. Reports were circulated that an attack was about to be made on the enemy's position, and that it was only delayed till arrangements could be made to act in concert with the army of Marshal Blucher, when at ten o'clock news was received that the main body of the Prussian army had retreated towards Wavre. This

intelligence rendered it probable that Napoleon would now move all his disposable force to attack the Duke of Wellington's position; and as that part of the army of the Netherlands which had assembled on this point would, in that case, have been unable to maintain its ground against the enemy, without the co-operation of the Prussians, a retreat became indispensable; the cavalry formed line to cover it, and before eleven, the different divisions commenced retiring along the roads leading to the several points of a position it was intended they should occupy in front of the forest of Soignes, the principal line of retreat being along the great road leading from Quatre Bras through Genappe. As the infantry retired, the cavalry gradually followed the same track, and watched the movements of the enemy, who now began a sluggish pursuit.

Napoleon slept on the night of the 16th at Fleurus, and early on the 17th reiterated his orders* to Marshal Ney, directing his movement upon Quatre Bras; at the same time giving orders to the imperial guard, the 2d and 3d divisions of the 6th corps, the 2d division of the 1st corps of cavalry, and the 4th corps

* See Appendix, Nos. XVI., XVII.

of cavalry, to march upon Quatre Bras by the great Namur road, with intent to attack the left wing of the English army; whilst Marshal Grouchy was directed to march in pursuit of the Prussians with the 3d and 4th corps *d'armée*, the 1st division of the 6th corps, the 1st division of the 1st corps of cavalry, and with the 2d corps of cavalry, and to manœuvre so as to keep the Prussians separated from the Anglo-Belgians, and constantly to keep up communication with the army under Napoleon.—On arriving in front of Quatre Bras they found that the British troops had retreated, and nothing but a rear guard of cavalry, with a few pieces of artillery, retained the ground; they therefore immediately commenced the pursuit.

The division of Gen. Subervic, consisting of the 1st and 2d lancers, and the 11th chasseurs, with a battery of horse artillery, directed by Gen. Drouot, formed the French advanced guard: it was supported by the 4th corps of cavalry under Gen. Milhaud, and after it the 1st, 2d, and 6th corps of infantry, and lastly, the imperial guard. The retreat of the English infantry was covered by the 3d division, and the rear guard of the whole army of the Netherlands was formed by part of M. Gen. Grant's brigade of light cavalry, supported by part of

Lord Edward Somerset's brigade. The 3d division retreated from Sarta Mavelines upon Bezy, and thence into the great road near Genappe; and the excellent order in which it was conducted in the broad face of day, prevented the enemy deriving any advantage from it. As the rear guard of the British cavalry was retiring from Genappe, the French advanced guard came up with it, and the Earl of Uxbridge directed the 7th hussars to charge a column of the enemy's lancers as it debouched from the town. At this place the banks on the sides of the road are high and steep, so that the English cavalry were unable to get at the flank of the enemy's column, which alone could derive benefit from the nature of the ground: the French lancers, formed in this hollow way, presented an almost impenetrable row of pikes, and though the 7th hussars attacked them with the greatest gallantry, and the officers set the bravest example, they could not succeed in making any impression, and were driven back. A renewed effort was alike unsuccessful, and the enemy in his turn advanced to attack the English, when the Earl of Uxbridge, seeing a more favourable opportunity, ordered the horse guards to charge, and the result was the complete overthrow of the French advanced guard; thereby checking the pursuit, and giving ample

time for the infantry to take up its ground in the position of Mount St. Jean, covering the approach to Bruxelles by the roads from Charleroi and Nivelles. It had commenced raining early in the day, and during the afternoon a most violent thunder-storm came on, and passed directly over the positions of the armies: it rained torrents, and the ground and road became deluged, so as to add much to the fatigue of marching. It was near seven o'clock in the evening when the French advanced guard appeared on the great road on the heights behind Belle Alliance. Their artillery commenced firing down the great road on the English rear guard: a few pieces of English artillery were placed in battery, and soon silenced those of the enemy, whose only object was, evidently, to ascertain the presence of the English army, as it was much too late for a general action to take place, and it would require some hours before the main body of the French army could march into position. The English army bivouacked on the ground it occupied, which was open land, cultivated chiefly with rye, which in many places grew to the height of seven feet. Meantime, Marshal Grouchy, who was charged with the pursuit of the Prussian army, having under his orders the 3d and 4th corps *d'armée*,

and the 3d division of the 6st corps, with the 1st division of the 1st corps and the whole of 2d corps of cavalry, had made but little progress: halting his troops around Gembloux and remaining there during the night, although, at six o'clock in the evening, he received positive information of the direction in which the Prussians had retired. Marshal Blucher was thus enabled to assemble his army, and having been joined by the 4th corps under Gen. Bulow, which on the former day had concentrated at Gembloux, he retreated on Wavres, and occupied a position there on the left bank of the Dyle. A rear guard was left on the right bank, to observe the movements of Marshal Grouchy, and give timely notice of his approach.

During the night of the 17th the respective armies were posted as follows:

The allied army of the Netherlands bivouacked in position on the heights of Mount St. Jean.

The Prussian army bivouacked on the ground it had taken up near Wavres.

That part of the French army commanded by

Napoleon in person, bivouacked on the heights of Planchenoit, on the right and left of the great road.

That part of the French army commanded by Marshal Grouchy bivouacked around Gembloux, with patroles on the road towards Wavres.

The division of Girard, which had suffered so severely in the battle of Ligny, was employed during the 17th in rendering assistance to the wounded French, and great numbers were conveyed to Charleroi.

It is worthy of remark how important the manœuvres of this day were to the French army, and how little advantage they derived from them. The victory of the 16th over the Prussians had compelled the Duke of Wellington to retire, in order to avoid the possibility of having the left flank of his army turned by the French troops coming from Ligny. The enemy had therefore both adverse armies in full retreat before him during the whole of the 17th, and what should have been of invaluable consequence to his success, these armies were farther apart than on the former day; and thus

again offered the fairest chance for his effecting their separation. The intricate nature of the country, between the positions of the two armies, at Mount St. Jean and at Wavres, was well suited to his making a movement upon one flank: he might therefore have moved nearly the whole of his force against one of the allied armies, without the knowledge of the other; and again, a decisive success over one of these armies might have completed their final separation. Every hour was of importance to his success, and yet we see, unaccountably, great delays took place both in the corps under Marshal Grouchy and in that under Marshal Ney; the former letting the Prussian army gain a march over him, and the latter neglecting the invaluable opportunity of attacking an army in retreat.

BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

The bivouack on the night of the 17th was much worse than the former; the ground was trampled into mud, and before morning the cold was excessive: few fires had been kindled, owing to the heavy rain which fell. At dawn of morning on the 18th, the weather became more favourable, and fires were lighted: an irregular discharge of musketry was heard on

all sides, the men being busily employed in drying their muskets and preparing for action. About eight o'clock we heard that the French intended attacking us, and the Duke of Wellington ordered some change in the positions of the different corps; the columns were moved in advance towards the brow of the rising ground which forms the position, and in a short time the army of the Netherlands was disposed in the following order:—

The centre, formed of the corps of the Prince of Orange, supported by the contingents of Brunswick and Nassau, was posted on the heights situated in the angle formed by the junction of the roads which lead from Genappe and Nivelles to Bruxelles; its right was in rear of Hougoumont, a farm situated at the foot of the height, and near the road leading from Nivelles; its left, in rear of La Haye Sainte, a farm which adjoins the road leading from Genappe. The 1st division, under Major-Gen. Cooke, formed the right; the 3d, under Lieut.-Gen. Alten, the left of the centre. The posts of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte were occupied by the light troops of the respective divisions in their rear.

The right wing, formed of the corps of Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill, was thrown back nearly

at right angles with the centre, having its right covered by Merke-braine, a village near Braine-la-Leud, and its left in communication with the right of Major-Gen. Cooke's division, on the height in rear of Hougoumont. Col. Mitchell's brigade, forming part of the 4th division, under Lieut.-Gen. Colville, formed the right, and the 2d division, under Lieut.-Gen. Clinton, formed the left of Lord Hill's corps.

The left wing, formed of the 5th division, under Lieut.-Gen. Picton, and Major Gen. Lambert's brigade of the 6th division, had its right upon the road leading from Genappe, and in communication with the left of Lieut.-Gen. Alten's division, and its left extended towards Ter la Haye. Strong detachments were posted at La Haye, a hamlet which covered the extreme left of the position. Communication was kept up with the Prussian army, by patroles, through Ter la Haye and Ohain. The Belgian troops were distributed, part on the extreme right, on the height covering the approach to Braine-la-Leud, and part on the extreme left and in the hamlet of La Haye.

The cavalry, under Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Uxbridge, were in greatest force in rear of the left wing and left of the centre. Major-

Gen. Grant's brigade of hussars was posted in rear of Major-Gen. Cooke's division on the right centre, having outposts extended to a considerable distance on the plateau ground, between Hougoumont and Braine-la-Leud. Major-Gen. Lord Edward Somerset's brigade, formed entirely of the cavalry of the guards, was posted on the slope of the ground immediately in rear of the left of Lieut.-Gen. Alten's division: Major General Dornberg's brigade of light dragoons was formed in rear of Lord Edward Somerset's brigade. Col. Estorff's brigade of Hanoverian light cavalry was placed in reserve behind the former brigade and near the angle formed by the junction of the two great roads at Mont St. Jean. Major-Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of heavy dragoons was on the left of the great road, leading to Genappe and Charleroi, and was posted immediately in rear of Sir Thomas Picton's division, having its right near the great road. Major-General Vandeleur's brigade of light dragoons was placed in rear of the left of Sir Thomas Picton's division: and on the extreme left of the whole line was the hussar brigade of Major-Gen. Vivian.

The artillery of the English, King's German legion, and Hanoverian contingents, present at the battle of Waterloo, consisted of eight

troops of English, and two troops of King's German legion, (horse artillery), five brigades of English, and one brigade of King's German legion, (foot artillery), two brigades of Hanoverian (foot artillery), making together eighteen batteries of six guns each, or one hundred and eight pieces of cannon. Prior to the commencement of hostilities, the horse artillery had exchanged their six-pounders for nine-pounders, excepting two troops; so that nearly the whole artillery on the field were of heavy calibre. Therefore, generally, every battery on the field had five guns, nine-pounders, and one five and a half-inch howitzer, excepting one troop of horse artillery, which was armed exclusively with howitzers. That is, there were seventy-five guns nine-pounders, 10 six-pounders, and 23 howitzers*; making together the total 108 pieces of cannon, which were distributed on the front of the position, in the following order:

In front of the centre.—One troop of horse artillery, on the right of Gen. Cooke's division, to direct its fire down the great road of Nivelles. One troop of horse, and three brigades of foot

* I have been thus particular in stating the force and composition of the Anglo-Hanoverian artillery, as the most incorrect and exaggerated statements have gone abroad respecting it.

artillery, were placed in front of Major-Gen. Maitland's brigade of guards, which formed the left of Gen. Cooke's division: this was the largest battery of the allies, there being in no other part of the field so large a number of guns assembled upon one point. One troop of horse artillery was placed on the height immediately behind Hougoumont, and in front of Major-Gen. Byng's brigade of guards, which formed the right of Gen. Cooke's division. One brigade of foot artillery in front of the right, and two troops of horse artillery in front of the left of Gen. Alten's division.

In front of the left wing.—One troop of horse and one brigade of foot artillery, in front of Major-Gen. Kempt's brigade, which formed the right of Sir Thomas Picton's division. Two brigades of foot, and one of horse artillery, in front of Sir Dennis Packe's brigade, which formed the left of Sir T. Picton's division.

In the second line.—One brigade of foot, and three troops of horse artillery: these were chiefly in rear of Lord Hill's corps, which formed the right wing of the army, and in the afternoon were called into action, chiefly in the centre.

In this position the Duke of Wellington had resolved to await the enemy's attack, and had written to Marshal Blucher, requesting, in that event, the aid of a part of his force, which was promised; and it was supposed that the 4th corps of the Prussian army, under Gen. Bulow, would arrive on the right flank of the enemy at one o'clock in the afternoon.

As the morning advanced the weather became more favourable, and the French began preparations for the attack. Orders were given for the distribution and lines of march of each corps, and about ten o'clock we could distinctly see them move down to their several positions, where they were drawn up in the following order:

The right wing, formed of the 1st corps d'armée, under Count d'Erlon, and consisting of four divisions of infantry, had its 2d division under Gen. Dowzelot, resting its left on the great road leading from Genappe to Bruxelles, near the house of Belle Alliance: it was formed of the 13th light infantry, and the 17th, 19th, and 51st regiments of the line, forming two brigades. The 1st division, under Gen. Quiot, was placed on the right of the former; it con-

sisted of the 28th, 54th, 55th, and 105th regiments of the line, and was formed into two brigades. The 3d division, under Gen. Marcognet, was on the right of Gen. Quiot's; it consisted of the 21st, 25th, 45th, and 46th regiments of the line, forming two brigades. The 4th division, under Gen. Durutte, was on the right of the 3d division; it was formed of the 8th, 99th, 85th, and 95th regiments of the line, making two brigades. These eight brigades were drawn up on two lines; the several regiments were in columns of battalions by divisions, each regiment consisting of two battalions, and the general direction of the line was between Belle Alliance on its left, and the village of Frichermont on the right, so that it was nearly parallel to the left wing of the Duke of Wellington's army. The division of light cavalry under Gen. Jacquinot, consisting of the 3d and 7th chasseurs, and the 3d and 4th lancers, was formed on the extreme right of Count d'Erlon's infantry, having its right flank resting on the wood of Frichermont.

The left wing, formed of the 2d corps d'armée, under Count Reille, and consisting of three divisions, had its 1st division under Gen. Bachelu, resting its right flank on the great road lead-

ing from Genappe to Bruxelles, near La Belle Alliance; it consisted of the 11th, 61st, 72d, and 108th regiments of the line, forming two brigades. The 4th division, under Gen. Foy, was formed on the left of the 1st division; it consisted of the 4th light infantry, and the 92d, 93d, and 100th regiments of the line, formed into two brigades. The 2d division, under Prince Jerome Buonaparte, was on the left of Gen. Foy's; it consisted of the 1st and 2d light infantry, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments of the line, forming two brigades. These six brigades were drawn up on two lines, the several regiments in columns of battalions by divisions; the 108th and the 3d regiments of the line, and all the light infantry regiments in this corps, consisted of three battalions each, the remaining regiments of two battalions each; and the general direction which the lines formed was between La Belle Alliance on the right to the Nivelles road on the left, having the left about half a mile distant from the wood of Hougoumont. The division of light cavalry under Gen. Piré, consisting of the 1st and 6th chasseurs, and the 5th and 6th lancers, was formed on the left of Count Reille's infantry, across the Nivelles road, extending its left on the plateau ground towards Braine-la-Leud.

In this manner the 1st and 2d corps d'armée, with the light cavalry of their respective corps on the flanks, formed the first line, or corps de bataille, of the French army.

The second line was of cavalry.—The right wing of the second line was formed of the 4th corps of cavalry, under Count Milhaud; it consisted of two divisions of cuirassiers; the first under Gen. Wathier, consisting of the 1st, 4th, 7th, and 12th regiments of cuirassiers, formed into two brigades; and the second, under Gen. Delort, consisting of the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 10th regiments of cuirassiers, formed into two brigades, were drawn up on two lines in rear of the infantry of Count d'Erlon, having their left near the great road to Bruxelles, and their right in the direction of Frichermont. These four brigades were formed in columns of regiments by squadrons.—The left wing of the second line was formed of the 3d corps of cavalry under the Count de Valmy; it consisted of two divisions, the first, under Gen. L'Heritier, composed of the 2d and 7th dragoons and 8th and 11th cuirassiers, forming two brigades; and the second under Gen. Roussell, composed of the 1st and 2d carabineers, and the 2d and 3d cuirassiers, forming

two brigades, were drawn up on two lines, in rear of the infantry of Count Reille, having their right a short distance from the great road to Bruxelles, and their left near the road leading to Nivelles. These four brigades of the 3d corps of cavalry were formed in columns of regiments by squadrons.

In rear of the centre, and on the left of the great road, were two divisions of the 6th corps d'armée, under Lieut.-Gen. Count Lobau, viz.; the 1st division under Lieut.-Gen. Simmer, consisting of the 5th, 11th, 27th, and 84th regiments of the line, forming two brigades; and the 2d division under Lieut.-Gen. Jeannin, consisting of the 5th light infantry, and the 10th, 47th, and 107th regiments of the line, forming two brigades. These two divisions were formed in columns of regiments by divisions, the whole forming one great column of reserve to the centre.

In rear of the centre, and on the right of the great road, were two divisions of light cavalry, viz.; the division of Gen. D'Aumont, attached to the 6th corps, and consisting of the 4th, 11th, and 12th chasseurs; and the 2d division of Count Pajol's corps of cavalry,

under Lieut.-Gen. Subervic, consisting of the 1st and 2d lancers, and the 9th chasseurs. These two divisions, making four brigades, were formed in columns of regiments by squadrons, the whole forming one great column in rear of the centre.

The grand reserve to the whole line of battle was formed on a third line, on the heights in rear of the position; it consisted entirely of the imperial guards, cavalry and infantry. In the centre of this line was the 1st division, formed of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments of grenadiers of the old guard, commanded by Gen. Count Friant, colonel of the *grenadiers-à-pied* of the imperial guard. This division was on the left of the great road leading to Bruxelles, the regiments forming it were in contiguous columns by divisions. The 2d division, formed of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments of chasseurs of the old guard, commanded by Gen. Count Morand, colonel of *chasseurs-à-pied* of the imperial guard, was on the right of the great road leading to Bruxelles, and the regiments forming it were in contiguous columns by divisions.

On the right of the 2d division of the old

guard, was the division of the young guard, commanded by Gen. Barrois; it consisted of the 1st and 3d regiments of tirailleurs, and the 1st and 3d regiments of voltigeurs. This division was also formed in contiguous columns of regiments by divisions.

The heavy cavalry of the old guard, commanded by Gen. Guyot, and consisting of one regiment of *grenadiers-à-cheval*, and one regiment of dragoons, were formed in columns of regiments by squadrons, on the left of the infantry of the old guard.

The light cavalry of the old guard, commanded by Gen. Lefebvre Desnouettes, and consisting of one regiment of *chasseurs-à-cheval* and one regiment of lancers, (in red), were formed in columns of regiments by squadrons on the right of the infantry.

This admirable formation of the French line of battle presented resources to its general on every point; and it is scarcely possible to imagine any order of battle which should be equally strong on all points, or where in the event of disorder, remedies could be sooner applied; or where, in the event of partial success, any ad-

vantage might be sooner followed up or improved, by the speedy support of its reserves.

About ten o'clock the enemy commenced moving down to the attack; the extreme left of his infantry line bearing obliquely towards the wood of Hougoumont, which was the most prominent angle of the allied position, and consequently exposed to the first efforts of the enemy; its possession being almost a necessary preliminary operation to any attack on the centre. The chateau of Hougoumont, with its enclosures, wood, and orchard, form a large quadrangle, divided into four nearly equal parts by two hedge-rows, which intersect it at right angles from the centre of its sides. The two divisions nearest to the allied position consist, that on the right, of the chateau, stables, and other out-buildings, to which is adjoined a garden, inclosed on its southern and eastern sides by a high wall; that on the left, of a large orchard, bounded on its western side by the eastern wall of the garden, and on its three remaining sides by tall and compact hedges. The two divisions nearest to the French position, consist, that on the right, which is immediately in front of the garden and chateau, of thick coppice-wood; that on the left and in front of

the orchard, of an open field, bounded on its western side by the wood, on its northern side by the orchard, and on the two remaining by the large hedge-row which forms the boundary of the whole inclosure.

As the massy divisions of the enemy gradually advanced, skirmishers were thrown out, who soon spread themselves over the whole front of the French left wing. The artillery which accompanied the several divisions could now be seen making rapid movements to the little eminences in front of their line, and there forming batteries for the protection of the attack. At this moment the weather became brighter, and the imposing display of the hostile army, advancing to give battle, was indescribably grand; it was perfectly new to the English army: those who had gone through the arduous campaigns in the Peninsula had not yet witnessed such regularity in the movements of the enemy; for there, the nature of the country seldom admitted the adoption of an uniform order of battle. A few minutes before eleven o'clock, the tirailleurs of Prince Jerome's division became engaged with the light troops posted in the skirts of the wood of Hougoumont and along the whole front of the inclosure. At first a few

straggling shots announced the commencement of the action; the intervals of shots quickly lessened, till at length the firing increased to an incessant roll of musketry. The columns of Jerome's division approached nearer the wood, to support the light troops; and the English artillery, with promptitude and precision unequalled in that of any other army, commenced firing upon them from the heights in front of Major-Gen. Cooke's division; and no sooner did the enemy discover the English battery, than his artillery opened a brisk fire to silence it; but the English artillerymen persevered in a steady fire against the French infantry, and it was most satisfactory to observe the admirable manner in which the guns were served, the officers themselves pointing their cannon with unerring aim. One French column was completely dispersed by the shells from our howitzers. The roar of cannon on both sides grew loud and incessant, the weather continued to mend, and the sight became magnificent; the whole valley in front of Gen. Cooke's division became covered with the firing. The French light troops succeeded in penetrating into the wood; they were soon followed up by reserves, and the contest on this point became each moment more severe; great part of a

battalion of Nassau troops, which had been stationed in the wood, were driven from their post, and the light companies of the 2d brigade of guards under Lieut.-Col. Macdonald and Lieut.-Col. Home, on the right of the inclosure, and those of the 1st brigade of guards under Lt.-Col. Lord Saltoun, in the orchard on the left, then sustained the furious onset of the enemy's columns of attack. Every advantage was skilfully made use of, which the natural defences of the walls and hedges afforded to the defendants; the whole length of the garden wall had been loop-holed, and the hedge which separates the orchard from the field in its front was high and compact, so as to afford an excellent breastwork to the troops defending it, and from whence they opened a destructive fire on the French columns. The enemy notwithstanding persevered in attempting to carry this point, and a battalion began to penetrate into the orchard, through a large gap in the fence, forming an outlet into the wood. Lord Saltoun, seeing this favourable opportunity of getting fairly at them, charged the head of the French column with the light infantry of the 1st guards, and this brave attempt fortunately checked the enemy, many of whom were slain on this point, and the remainder compelled to retreat into the

wood, where they suffered still greater loss from the fire directed by part of the Nassau battalion, and light companies of the 2d brigade of guards from behind the garden wall. The enemy, failing on this side, now attempted to get in rear of the chateau by its right, and the columns which had moved in support of the battalion defeated by Lord Saltoun, changed their direction and made a most resolute attack against the chateau; but the light troops of the Coldstream and 3d guards, received them with undaunted firmness, and after a severe conflict drove them off, and succeeded in regaining a part of the wood in its front.

Hitherto the battle had been almost wholly confined to this point; but the whole of the corps of Reille had moved in advance, its artillery had been placed in battery, and a most violent cannonade ensued along the whole centre; the fire of the enemy being briskly returned by the English artillery from their several positions already described, in front of Gen. Alten's and Gen. Cooke's divisions.

The whole corps of Count d'Erlon at the same time moved in advance, and numerous batteries of his artillery took post and com-

menced an incessant fire against the left wing of the allied position; the strongest batteries of the enemy were contiguous to the great road leading from Belle Alliance to La Haye Sainte, and about midway between those points. The firing was promptly returned by the artillery of the allies, from the rising ground in front of their left wing. In this manner the battle was engaged along the whole line, and the roar of cannon became tremendous. Upwards of two hundred pieces of artillery were at this moment vomiting destruction on both armies, and the havoc caused by the round shot and shells was severe on both sides. The infantry, which were obliged to be posted near the artillery, suffered great loss from the fire which the enemy directed against the English guns; and the shot which missed the first line, frequently plunged into the columns in the rear. The enemy displayed great quantities of his cavalry, and the Duke of Wellington ordered the British army to form squares, in readiness should they advance to the attack; but the French cavalry did not yet commence any important movement, and they remained hitherto unengaged, with the exception of some trifling skirmishing, between part of Major-Gen. Grant's brigade of light cavalry, and that of Gen. Piré,

on the plateau ground, to the right of Hougoumont. The enemy, under cover of the cavalry, moved forward a battery of horse artillery on the Nivelles road, and opened a fire on the flank of Hougoumont and of Gen. Cooke's division. A brigade of horse artillery, under Lieut.-Col. Smyth, moved down the Nivelles road to oppose it, and by its superior fire, compelled the enemy to withdraw. Every where the fire of the English artillery was superior to that of the enemy; the nature of the ground, it must be allowed, was more favourable to the allies than the French, as the front of the British position was more abrupt than that of the enemy, where the slope, being gradual, and of greater extent, obliged their infantry to remain more exposed to the fire of the English.

The enemy having failed in his first attempt to gain possession of Hougoumont, now directed Count d'Erlon's corps to make an attack against La Haye Sainte, La Haye, and the left wing of the English army. This attack was made in the following order: Gen. Dowzelot, with the 2d division, moved against La Haye Sainte; Gen. Durutte, with the 4th division, moved against Papelotte and La Haye; Gen. Quiot and Marcognet, with the 1st and 3d

divisions, advanced in columns, to carry the position between these points. The lancers of Gen. Jacquinot's division of cavalry supported the 1st and 3d divisions, which attacked the British left wing, and the left of the whole attack was supported by the division of Gen. Bachelu of Reille's corps, on the left of the great road.—Gen. Foy's division kept up the communication between Gen. Bachelu and Prince Jerome, who was ordered to renew his efforts against Hougoumont, in order to keep up the attention of the Duke of Wellington to this point, and prevent his detaching troops to support the feeble line of his left wing. The French artillery made some charges to cover this great attack, and a strong battery was directed against the chateau of Hougoumont. The Duke of Wellington sent Major-Gen. Byng, with the 2d brigade of guards, to support the light troops which were posted at Hougoumont, and then directed his attention to the more important attack against his left wing. At half-past two it began with an overwhelming fire of round and grape shot, under cover of which the French columns advanced towards their several destinations: the French light troops which headed the attack succeeded in dislodging the Belgian troops posted in front

of the left wing, and next engaged those of Gen. Kempt's and Gen. Packe's brigades. These obstinately contested the ground, but were obliged to yield to the superior numbers of the enemy, who displayed great bravery and skill in his advance, turning successively the flanks of the British light troops, and by his numbers in front advancing with great firmness through a tremendous fire from the English artillery. The divisions of Gen. Quiot and Marcognet continued to gain ground, but Gen. Dowzelot, failing in this first attempt to gain possession of La Haye Sainte, the two former were unsupported on their flanks, and Gen. Picton directed the gallant brigades of Kempt and Packe to advance and drive the enemy down from the position. A most deadly fire was opened upon them by the regiments forming these brigades; and the Earl of Uxbridge seeing the favourable moment for attacking them, directed the brigade of the brave Sir William Ponsonby to charge the French columns. This brigade, consisting of the 1st or royal dragoons, the 2d or North British dragoons (Scots Greys), and the 6th or Inniskilling dragoons, together with the 11th and 16th dragoons forming part of Gen. Vandeleur's brigade, rushed forward with invincible impetuosity into the midst of the

French columns before they had time to form squares, and the front ranks of the enemy falling back upon the rear, threw the whole into confusion. A dreadful slaughter ensued, and the French retreated in disorder, leaving the ground covered with the dead and wounded. About two thousand prisoners were taken, and the British cavalry, not content with this splendid success, pushed forward to the rear of the first line of French infantry, ascended the opposite heights, and commenced disorganizing the artillery of Count D'Erlon's corps, dismounting the guns, and sabring the horses, to render the batteries as useless as possible. The impetuosity of the British cavalry led them on too far into the French line, and Napoleon, seeing the English cavalry unsupported, directed Count Milhaud to attack them with a brigade of his cuirassiers, some of whom had been moved in advance to the height between Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte, to fill up the vacancy occasioned in the French line by the advance of the divisions under Dowzelot and Bachelu, and they had now a most advantageous opportunity of attacking the flank of Sir William Ponsonby's brigade. The French cuirassiers advanced to the charge, and a short but furious conflict took place. Sir William

Ponsonby, seeing that all attempts to maintain the ground he had gained would be fruitless, withdrew his brigade, which now in its retreat suffered great loss, having to run the gauntlet of the French cavalry, artillery, and skirmishers. The gallant Ponsonby, foremost in the attack, and last in the retreat, was soon surrounded by the French cavalry; and although completely in their power, and in fact their prisoner, his horse being unable to extricate itself from the cloggy ground, he was pierced with several wounds, and fell dead to the ground. The brave Sir Thomas Picton also fell at the head of his division, and the English army was thus deprived of two of its most zealous and skilful generals. Whilst this conflict took place in the valley between La Haye Sainte and La Haye, Gen. Donzelot, who had been unable to gain possession of La Haye Sainte, kept up a brisk contest with the left of Gen. Alten's division. The brigade of Col. Ompteda, consisting of the 1st and 2d light and 8th line battalions of the King's German legion, supported by the brigade of Hanoverian militia, under Gen. Kielmansegge, opposed a brave resistance, and were driving the enemy down the heights, when part of Milhaud's cuirassiers, seeing an opportunity, charged the Hanoverian infantry, and although

they instantly re-formed squares, the enemy persevered in his advance, passed through the first line in the intervals between the squares, and mounted the crest of the position. Lord Edward Somerset, with the invincible brigade of household troops, consisting of the life guards, royal horse guards, and 1st dragoon guards, rushed forward against the mailed cavalry of the enemy, and swept the intruders from the ground they had so rashly ascended, driving them up the opposite heights back into their own line. Lord Edward Somerset then withdrew his brigade by the great road, and resumed his position to await fresh attacks. Colonel Ponsonby, with the 12th light dragoons, had been stationed on the extreme left of the English infantry, with orders to act discretionally; and on perceiving the unsteady advance of part of Durutte's division, he resolved on attacking it*, and immediately with his regiment descended the heights, and broke into the enemy's columns, which he dispersed: the charge was followed by some Belgian cavalry, who added to the slaughter which ensued. This charge of Col. Ponsonby's regiment caused a

* I am indebted to the celebrated author of the Pleasures of Memory for permission to publish the account which he took from Col. Ponsonby's own description of this attack, and have given it in full in the Appendix, No. XIV.

severe loss to the enemy, and contributed much to heighten the confusion in which the whole right wing of the French army had been thrown. Gen. Jaquinot, who commanded the light cavalry of Count D'Erlon's corps, advanced with the 3d and 4th lancers, to rescue the French infantry, whilst the French artillery poured destruction alike on the English and French in the struggle which took place. The French lancers took advantage of the disorder which unavoidably ensues after a cavalry charge, and being superior in number, and having the advantage of lances, succeeded in compelling the 12th to retreat: the intrepid Col. Ponsonby was overtaken by the enemy, and struck to the earth by seven wounds, where he was left, as was supposed, dead on the field.

The formidable attacks made by the whole right wing of the enemy had been defeated on all points, and although the allies suffered severe loss, that of the enemy was much greater; the French columns having received the fire of the English infantry and artillery both in the advance and retreat, and were besides dreadfully cut up by the English cavalry.

Meantime the enemy had renewed his efforts

against the post of Hougoumont with greater force, and by the shells from his howitzers, succeeded in setting fire to the chateau and straw-stacks adjoining it. The flames burnt irresistibly, and volumes of smoke spread over the front of the English centre and right: the Duke of Wellington had directed the 2d brigade of guards, under Gen. Byng, to support the troops stationed there, and they opportunely met the enemy's columns which were endeavouring to surround the chateau: a severe engagement took place, and after a hard struggle, the guards silenced the enemy's musketry, and charged the French columns, who retreated with great loss through the wood. The enemy never gained possession either of the garden or chateau; but some of his infantry, more daring than others, with great bravery penetrated into the court-yard of the chateau, by bursting open the door and its barricadoes, but the assailants were all slain and the gates again secured, so that all further efforts to force them open were effectually resisted. The fire which burnt down the whole interior of the chateau unfortunately destroyed many brave soldiers who had been wounded and crawled thither for shelter. We must, in justice, give the French and English equal praise for the gallantry displayed in the

attack and defence of this post: in no part of the field did the enemy more obstinately persevere in his attempts to gain possession of the point in contest, and nowhere was greater determination displayed by the troops in the defence. In the cannonade which was kept up between the French and English artillery during the conflict at Hougoumont, the brigade of Gen. Maitland suffered dreadful loss from the shot and shells of the enemy; and the calm and intrepid Gen. Cooke had his arm torn almost entirely off by a cannon shot: the command of the 1st division then devolved on Gen. Byng, who having succeeded in repelling the enemy from Hougoumont, took his station with Gen. Maitland's brigade on the height.

Napoleon now finding that all efforts against Hougoumont were unsuccessful, and that all attempts against the centre would be alike unavailing without the possession of La Haye Sainte, directed the division of Gen. Donzelot, supported on its right by Gen. Quiot's division, and on its left by Gen. Bachelu, to renew its attempt on La Haye Sainte. The French light troops pressed forward beyond the farm, and thus intercepted the communication between its defenders and the troops in rear on the

crest of the position; the French columns advanced to the walls, and several times attempted to scale them, and were as often repulsed. Major Baring, with part of the 2d light battalion of the King's German legion, garrisoned this little post, and it was not till these brave men had expended the last round of their ammunition, that the enemy succeeded in gaining possession of it: the French troops, enraged at the obstinate defence which had been made, and the loss which they had sustained from the defenders, put to death the few of them who yet survived. No sooner was this point gained than the enemy moved down a large body of cuirassiers, of Milhaud's corps, into the valley between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont: here they were almost entirely sheltered from the fire of the English artillery, and they were in more immediate readiness to take advantage of any disorder which might occur in the English line. A series of attacks were now made against the centre of the allies, and some French horse-artillery were brought up, under cover of their infantry and cavalry, to the rise of the position behind La Haye Sainte, and the enemy made repeated efforts to establish himself on the English position. Napoleon was in the heat of the action at La Haye Sainte, and his

numerous cavalry made repeated charges between the battalions of the allies, which were formed in squares to resist their attacks; the British cavalry constantly driving down that of the enemy; and the English artillery-men, who, during these charges, retired from their guns under cover of the squares, resumed their stations the moment the enemy were past the line, in time to pour destructive volleys of round and grape shot on their retreating squadrons. Wherever there was danger, there was the Duke of Wellington, who, in person, directed the movements of many columns of infantry: if the enemy gained any advantage, the Duke was there to remedy it, and the bravery and discipline of his men enabled him to restore order. The enemy had hoped by the possession of La Haye Sainte to break our line, and column after column renewed the attempt; but their opponents possessed a steadiness which was invincible, and the valour with which every attack was received and repulsed insured a victorious result. On the right of the centre, the guards were attacked by the cavalry of Gen. Kellermann, which approached under cover of a tremendous fire of artillery, and boldly penetrated between the squares: they were received with unshaken firmness; not a shot was fired at them till they

were within a few yards of the English muskets; a destructive discharge was then opened upon them, and they were driven back. This attempt to gain permanent footing on the height was several times repeated, and the French and English cavalry were sometimes engaged in the rear of and behind the squares, but the same result invariably ensued. Two columns of Brunswick troops which had been stationed on the right of the 1st English division, after Gen. Byng's brigade had moved down to Hougoumont, behaved with admirable steadiness during the attack made by the French cavalry. The last effort of the enemy's cavalry against the centre was made by the heavy cavalry of the imperial guard; but the most distinguished courage in the French officers, who daringly exposed their persons to draw on the fire of the English infantry before their regiments approached near the squares, could not prevail. The fire was reserved till the regiments came within a short distance of our infantry, and then their deliberate aim spread death through the enemy's ranks: the French dragoons, who were in this last attack, suffered the severest loss. Thus throughout the whole day the enemy had constantly been repelled, suffering in all his attempts much greater losses than the allies;

and as each attempt was repulsed, his army became more and more disorganized. The afternoon was now far advanced, and there was yet no appearance of the Prussian troops arriving to support the allies. Major (Lieut.-Col.) Stavely had been despatched by the Duke of Wellington to gain information respecting them: at four o'clock he found Marshal Blucher, who with a part of Bulow's corps had just arrived on the right flank of the enemy. The Prussians were crossing the ravine, between St. Lambert and Lasne, and advancing in the direction of the wood of Frischermont. Marshal Blucher promised to attack the enemy as soon as his men, who had performed a difficult march, could be formed. Meanwhile Napoleon had sent the cavalry of Gens. Daumont and Subervic to oppose the advance of the Prussians, who now began to show considerable forces between Lasne and Frischermont: each moment their display became more formidable, and Napoleon sent the 6th corps under Count Lobau to support the cavalry under Daumont, whose light horse were already engaged on the skirts of the wood of Frischermont. The French gained a temporary advantage on this point, but as the Prussians continued to receive reinforcements, their attack became more formidable, and they

began to gain ground. Buonaparte, now seeing the desperate situation of his army, resolved on a last effort against the English army with the infantry of the imperial guards. These troops, which had arrived on their position about midday, had remained entirely in reserve, and almost wholly out of the reach of the fire: they were now moved down to the ground adjoining Belle Alliance, and thence directed to their points of attack. The grenadiers of the old guard, consisting of four regiments, were directed as follows: the 1st regiment, of two battalions, 1300 strong, commanded by Gen. Petit, remained in reserve near Belle Alliance; the 2d regiment, from 1200 to 1300 strong, in two battalions, commanded by Gen. Christiani; the 3d regiment, 1200 strong, in two battalions, commanded by Gen. Poret; and the 4th regiment, 500 strong, of two battalions formed into one, commanded by Gen. Harlet, were directed to move down the great Bruxelles road towards La Haye Sainte, and then to turn across the open ground and ascend the British position about midway between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, whilst the chasseurs of the old guard formed another attack, which was to support the left of the grenadiers: these consisted of the 1st regiment, 1300 strong, in two

battalions, commanded by Gen. Cambronne; the 2d regiment, 1200 strong, in two battalions, commanded by Col. Mallet; the 3d regiment, 1200 strong, in two battalions, commanded by Gen. Petit, and the 4th of two battalions in one of 600 men, commanded by Gen. * * * * * * It was past six o'clock when these columns descended from the opposite heights. The French artillery seemed to rise again from the earth, and with renewed vigour blazed forth its showers of death to cover the advance of the French guards: the patience and determination with which the English soldiers withstood such repeated attacks and such severe losses was heroic. The men were ordered to await the close advance of the French columns, in order that their fire might be more decisive; and about half-past six o'clock the grenadiers of the old imperial guard appeared mounting the crest of the position on which the brigade of Major-Gen. Maitland was posted. The enemy's troops were in contiguous columns of battalions by companies; the 4th regiment on the right, the 3d in the centre, and the 2d on the left; thus forming five battalions in contiguous columns. Marshal Ney, who had his horse killed in advancing to the position, was on foot in front of the columns of the 4th and 3d regiments; and the brave manner in which he and the

French officers led this attack are deserving of the greatest praise. When within a short distance of the English line, Major-Gen. Maitland, who had wheeled up the flanks of the squares formed by the 2d and 3d battalions of the 1st regiment of guards, and formed a compact line four deep, directed his brigade to commence firing, and the destruction caused by the first volley in the enemy's columns at this short distance, checked their advance and began to cause confusion, which they were unable to remedy. The firing by independent files was kept up unremittingly for some minutes by the English guards, and with such precision, that these fine columns of the enemy, the *élite* of his whole army, became completely broken up; and the firing which they attempted to return in this disorganized state served rather to increase the disorder. The bravery of the French officers could not remedy the confusion, and the English guards being led by Gen. Maitland forward to charge the enemy, completed their rout. Whilst advancing in this manner, Gen. Maitland perceived the columns of chasseurs of the imperial guards already so far advanced as to menace the right flank of his brigade; he therefore immediately changed his front, and advancing his left, prepared to meet this fresh attack. During the former attacks on the cen-

tre, the Duke of Wellington, perceiving that the enemy made no serious attempt to turn his right flank, advanced the 2d division under Lieut.-Gen. Clinton, to support the 1st division, and directed Col. Mitchell's brigade of the 4th division to move towards the right of Hougoumont; thus the corps of Lord Hill, which in the early part of the day had been formed nearly at right angles to the centre, forming the apex of its angle at the great road of Nivelles, now began to form with the centre part of a crescent, and the hollow of this crescent was the scene of the attack made by the imperial guard. When the chasseurs of the guard arrived opposite Gen Maitland's brigade, Gen. Adam formed his brigade, consisting of the 52d, 71st, and 95th, on its right, bringing up his right flank so as to front the left flank of the French chasseurs, which were now received by the two fires of Gen. Maitland in front, and the more destructive one of Gen. Adam in flank. A brigade of English artillery had been posted between the brigades of infantry, and another with some Dutch artillery on the right of Gen. Adam's brigade, so that the destruction of this second column of attack was more rapid than the former, and the disorder in which it retreated augmented the confusion of the troops in rear, who, seeing the guard defeated, gave

up all for lost. The Duke of Wellington at this time perceived the artillery of Bulow's corps beginning to act in rear of the enemy's right wing, where Count Lobau, with the 6th corps, and the division of the young guard, under Gen. Barrois, were now warmly engaged; the long wished for moment of becoming the assailant in his turn was arrived, and orders were given to the whole army to make one general advance: the cavalry brigades of Sir Hussey Vivian and Sir Ormsby Vandeleur had previously been moved to the rear of the right centre, and, as the allies advanced, they spread their line over the crest of the English position, and then charged down into the French columns, which were now in complete disorder. Gen. Adam's brigade of infantry was the first to arrive on the enemy's position; it was closely followed by the brigade of Gen. Maitland, and the whole army from its different positions, all however pressing forward towards the great road leading to Genappe. At Belle Alliance the enemy made a show of resistance, but was soon obliged to retire by Gen. Adam. The French artillerymen, seeing the utter impossibility of withdrawing their guns, staid to fire their last destructive rounds at the English army in its advance. Four battalions of the old guard

formed squares on the heights near Belle Alliance to check the increasing disorder, and bravely held their ground for some moments against the English cavalry, till even they were drawn away in the vortex of disaster and rout, into which the whole French army were thrown: whole columns now threw down their arms and fled, and the panic spread throughout every part of the enemy's ranks, and the victorious army traversed in triumph the field of battle, which was now a scene of death and destruction such as Europe has seldom witnessed. Cannon, ammunition, and in fact the whole *materiel* of the army of Napoleon, fell into the hands of the conquerors; but comparatively few prisoners were taken, the victors barely stopping to give, and the vanquished disdaining to receive quarter: the French soldiers seemed to bear in mind the animating exhortation in Napoleon's proclamation, "Pour tout Français qui a du cœur, le moment est arrivé de vaincre ou de perir!" and the dying words of many a brave Frenchman were, "Vive Napoleon! Vive la patrie!' As the army of the Netherlands pursued the enemy, they were joined in the great road, on the heights near Planchenoit, by the advance of Bulow's corps, which had fought its way through that village to the great road,

augmenting greatly the dismay of the enemy in his retreat, now rendered more precarious from the Prussians having got so far in their rear. The 1st corps of the Prussian army, under Gen. Ziethen, had been advancing through Ohain, and it now joined the corps of Bulow. The Duke of Wellington having met Marshal Blucher at Belle Alliance, and received his promise of incessantly pursuing the enemy through the night, ordered the army of the Netherlands to desist. The fatigues and want of food which it had sustained rendered rest essential, and the army bivouacked on the ground which the night before had been occupied by the enemy. After the victory was gained, Marshal Blucher continued the pursuit with the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps of his army. At Genappe, the enemy, who had barricadoed the approach to the village, made a show of resistance, but the Prussians soon overpowered them. Sixty pieces of cannon were taken in the pursuit, and together with those taken by the Duke of Wellington's army, amounted to between two and three hundred pieces.

A victory of such magnitude, and of such importance from its consequences, could not of course be achieved without great loss on the

part of the victorious army. It is impossible to enumerate in this place the many instances of brave and distinguished officers who fell or were severely wounded in this hard fought battle. The Prince of Orange at the head of his corps had distinguished himself throughout the day; by the example of his gallantry and activity, in rallying the troops when partially disorganized by the severe attacks of the enemy, till he was severely wounded and borne from the field. The Earl of Uxbridge, who, during the contest, had headed the different charges, was seen in his splendid uniform moving like a meteor across the plain, followed by the British cavalry, whose course was marked by the slaughter it made. In the advance of the whole army, at the close of the day, he was one of many who suffered from the last deadly volley of the enemy's artillery, and had one of his legs shattered by a cannon shot. Many of the Duke of Wellington's personal staff were killed or wounded. The brave Gen. Barnes, Adj.-Gen. to the army, was severely wounded, and the Quarter-Master-General, Col. Delancey, received a wound, which, unfortunately for the country at large, proved fatal. It is but a just tribute to this distinguished officer's great worth, to add, that when assistance was offered to him on the field,

he declined accepting it, from a consciousness that his wound was mortal, and at the same time desired that those who came to assist him would give their immediate attendance to such of his brave countrymen who might be benefited by it, and he remained on the field during the night.

Let us now recur to the operations of Marshal Grouchy.—It will be remembered that the troops under his orders consisted of the 3d, 4th, and 1st division of the 6th corps of infantry; with the 1st division of the 1st, and whole of the 2d corps of cavalry; and that they were left in pursuit of the Prussian army after the battle of Ligny.

It was late on the 17th before Marshal Grouchy learnt the direction in which the mass of the Prussian army had retired, and he in consequence halted at Gembloux during the night of the 17th, his corps being disposed in the following order. The 2d corps of cavalry in advance on the road between Gembloux and Sart-à-Walhain; the 3d corps of infantry in support of the former, a short distance in advance of Gembloux; the 4th corps of infantry at Gembloux: Gen. Pajol, with his division of

cavalry, supported by the 1st division of the 6th corps of infantry, had pursued the retreat of part of the Prussian army on the Namur road, and then changed his direction towards Wavres; he was now on the right of Gembloux. Marshal Grouchy sent an aide-de-camp from Gembloux that night to inform Napoleon of his position, and acquainting him that the Prussians had retreated in two columns by the villages of Sauveniere and Sart-à-Walhain. On the 18th, Marshal Grouchy, now certain of the line of retreat which Blucher had taken, proceeded towards Wavres, and about mid-day the cavalry of Excelmans overtook the Prussian rear-guard at the skirts of the wood in front of Wavres, and Marshal Grouchy directed an attack upon it as soon as Vandamme's corps arrived: the Prussians were driven down into Wavres, and about four o'clock in the afternoon, the French gained possession of that part of the town situated on the right bank of the Dyle, but failing in their attempt to force the passage of the river there, an attack was made by a part of Gérard's corps at the mill of Bierge. The 3d Prussian corps under Gen. Thielman, defended these points with great obstinacy, and succeeded in repulsing the French. Marshal Grouchy distinctly heard the violent cannonade at Mont St. Jean, and

therefore attacked the Prussians with renewed vigour, to prevent Marshal Blucher from detaching any troops to support the allies, supposing that he had the whole Prussian army before him, and not being aware that Bulow's corps had, early in the morning, been put in march to fall upon Napoleon's right wing. Grouchy therefore, in order to turn the Prussian right wing, moved with that part of Gérard's corps which had arrived, down upon Limale, and succeeded in effecting his passage of the Dyle. In the early part of the day Marshal Grouchy had received orders* from Napoleon, in answer to the report which he had sent from Gembloux in the night; in this order Napoleon urges the Marshal to halt in the direction of Wavres, and to approximate his corps to the remainder of the army; and during the attack which Grouchy was making on Limale he received a fresh order† from Napoleon, urging him to manœuvre in the direction of Mont St. Jean, and informing him of the march of Bulow, whose troops had been discovered moving by St. Lambert towards the right flank of the position occupied by Napoleon. But at this moment, Vandamme's corps was warmly

* See Appendix, No. XV.

† See Appendix, No. XVI.

engaged at Wavres, and part of Gérard's at the mill of Bierge and Limale. The remainder of Gérard's corps, which had commenced its march much later in the morning from Gembloux, was not yet arrived, and Grouchy now found it out of his power to march upon the rear of Bulow, making fruitless efforts at Wavres and at Bierge, to force the Prussians from their strong holds. In this state, night put an end to the contest on this side. It appears from all accounts that Napoleon was confident of being enabled to defeat the army of the Duke of Wellington without the assistance of the troops which he had detached under Marshal Grouchy: he should have remembered the peculiar qualities of English troops in days of battle; the campaigns in the Peninsula should alone have proved to him that in the open field they were never defeated; and he should have borne in mind one of the essential rules, in which, in his instructions for days of battle, he impresses, "cette maxime, qu'un homme de guerre ne peut trop se graver dans l'esprit, que ce sont les plus opiniatres qui gagnent les batailles."

And when, later in the day, he received intelligence of Bulow's corps being in march upon his right flank, he seems to have calculated

on Marshal Grouchy being able to come up with its rear, notwithstanding the distance and difficult roads between Mont St. Jean and Wavres, whither Grouchy had received instructions to proceed. However, it seems to be the opinion of many able men, that Marshal Grouchy should at once have marched upon the scene of action at Mont St. Jean, as the cannonade which he heard evidently was that of the whole forces of Napoleon engaged against the Duke of Wellington's. With regard to the policy of accepting battle from the enemy on the plains of Waterloo, which the French writers have considered so great a fault in the tactics of the Duke of Wellington; it must be observed, that had Belgium been a country whose political and commercial interests would have led it to oppose invasion with energy, the best system to have been followed by the army of the Netherlands would be that of avoiding battles and drawing the enemy farther from his resources, and thus extending, and consequently weakening, the line of his operations, and compelling him to a warfare in detail; whilst the allies, retiring on their resources, would have accumulated strength, and might have selected their own time and place for giving battle to the invading army; and whilst the immense armies collected on the Rhine and

in Lombardy, by invading France, would of necessity compel the French troops in Belgium to retreat.—But as Belgium had for so long a period formed an integral part of the French empire; as both her political, and yet more her commercial interests, were assimilated with those of France, and, as may reasonably be supposed, a great portion of the population eagerly looked for the advance of Napoleon, it is manifest under these circumstances, that the farther he could penetrate into the country, the greater probability there would be of his success. The proclamations and other documents found in his baggage, which was captured, prove his confident expectation of gaining over the whole country to his cause, and the losses he might sustain in actions would then have been recruited in the country he invaded. It was therefore as much, nay more, the interest of the Duke of Wellington to meet the enemy, if not on the very frontier, as near to it as possible, and by an obstinate defence, still to secure the plan arranged for the combined efforts of all the allied armies against France. Could the Duke of Wellington have merely maintained his ground at Waterloo, so as to prevent the farther advance of the French army; or could he effect a junction with the Prussian army, his object

would have been equally gained; but, to prevent the enemy from gaining possession of the Flemish capital was of vital importance. It would appear, therefore, that as the French army, inferior in numbers to the united forces of Wellington and Blucher, could not at the same moment defeat both armies, there can hardly be a doubt that, subsequent to the battle of Ligny, all his efforts should, without delay, have been exerted against the Duke of Wellington's army, and these, with every man who could be spared from the pursuit of the Prussians, for it would have been against all the rules of war to quit with his main forces the road between Charleroi and Bruxelles, which was the true base of his operations, to follow the Prussian army along the bad cross roads in the direction of Louvain, and thus leave open his communications to the army of the Netherlands.

On the morning of the 19th, Gen. Thielman engaged the troops under Grouchy, who had not yet received news of the disaster of Napoleon, and therefore opposed a vigorous resistance, driving back the Prussians, and advancing in his turn to the attack: the Prussians retreated towards Rosieren, followed by the troops under Grouchy, when, at eleven o'clock, he heard of

the total defeat of the French army, and in consequence, immediately commenced his retreat towards Namur. On the morning of the 20th, his rear guard was attacked by the Prussians with partial success, but arriving soon at Namur, he there held the ramparts with his rear guard, till his whole corps had crossed the Sambre, and was in full march upon Dinant and along the banks of the Meuse. The Prussians made great efforts to force their entrance into Namur, before the French quitted it, and lost a great many men and officers in this unsuccessful attempt, and they did not enter the town till late in the evening. Marshal Blucher continued the pursuit of Napoleon's army, during the night of the 18th, with the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps of his army, and on the 19th, his cavalry were in close pursuit through Charleroi and on the road to Beaumont; the head-quarters were at Gosselies.

At dawn of morning of the 19th, working parties were sent out by the Duke of Wellington's army, to clear the great road of the French artillery and waggons, with which it was quite choked up, and orders were given for the march of the different corps. The English army engaged at Waterloo, with the 2d and 3d divisions of the Netherlands, Brunswick and Nassau con-

tingents, crossed from its bivouack on the Genappe road, to that leading to Nivelles. The two brigades of the 4th division, and remainder of the Netherland troops, which had been stationed to cover the approach to Hal on the 18th, were ordered also to march upon Nivelles, where, during the night of the 19th, the Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were established, the army of the Netherlands occupying all the surrounding villages.

On the 20th, the army of the Netherlands moved to the neighbourhood of Binch, where the Duke's head-quarters were during the succeeding night.

On the 21st the Anglo-Belgian army were distributed around Malplaquet. The Prussian head-quarters that day were at Noyelles, a village on the Sambre, equidistant between Avesnes and Landrecy, and on the 22d removed to Chatillon, a village near Le Cateau, where, on the same day, the Duke of Wellington had his head-quarters. The Prussian army had taken a few pieces of French artillery in the roads between Beaumont and Solre le Chateau, and as the armies advanced, every thing confirmed the total rout in which the enemy had been thrown: desertion quickly diminished his ranks,

and the French Generals had hitherto been unable to rally their troops. Napoleon on the 19th had proceeded to Phillippeville, in hopes of falling in with Marshal Grouchy in his retreat, but finding no news of his approach, set off by post for Paris, where the news of the defeat of the French army might cause disturbances requiring his immediate presence.

On the 23d and 24th Gen. Colville's division was moved to the right upon Cambray, and on the evening of the latter day storming parties were formed, and the town attacked on both sides, the troops escalading the walls near the Paris and Valenciennes gates: batteries of artillery were posted to cover the attack, and the town was taken almost immediately, and with trifling loss; the troops in the citadel surrendered on the 25th.

On the 26th, the Duke of Wellington moved to Peronne, with the 1st division, and directed an attack upon the horn-work which covers the approach to the town on its north side. The light troops of Major-Gen. Maitland's brigade of guards, led by Lord Saltoun, stormed the horn-work, and carried it with little loss, and the troops then advancing under cover of the

suburb to the counterscarp of the body of the place, kept up so hot a fire, that the enemy could not remain exposed on the ramparts: some pieces of Dutch artillery were brought to bear within the horn-work upon the gate of the town, when the civil authorities of the place interfered and urged an immediate capitulation, which was agreed to. Thus two strong barriers of the northern frontier were overcome almost without loss, and a secure line of operation afforded for marching direct upon Paris. The Prussian troops meanwhile, leaving forces to blockade Maubeuge, Avesnes, Landrecy, and Guise; Philippeville, Charlemont and Rocroy, advanced upon Compeigne: most of these places having feeble garrisons and being ill provisioned, surrendered after a short resistance: Avesnes was taken immediately, owing to the powder magazine blowing up, and destroying a great part of the town: Le Quesnoy was blockaded by Prince Frederic of the Netherlands, and taken after a short resistance: Marshal Blucher's head-quarters were on the 24th at Genappe, the 25th, at St. Quentin, the 26th, at Genvry, and the 27th at Compeigne: the 1st and 3d corps crossed the Oise at Compeigne, and marched upon Villers-Coterets, to flank the enemy's (Grouchy's) retreat from Soissons and Laon, whilst

the corps of Bulow proceeded by Verberie, where it crossed the Oise, and then directed its march upon Dammartin, to intercept the retreat of the enemy, pressed by the corps of Ziethen and Thielman, who succeeded in driving him from Villers-Coterets, and obliged him to retire by Meaux, on the Marne, in consequence of Bulow's advance upon Dammartin. The Prussian army then marched by the great road upon Gonesse and Paris, and on the 29th he occupied a position crossing the great roads leading from Paris to Gonesse and Meaux, his right towards St. Denis, his left observing Vincennes.

The Duke of Wellington's army advanced by the great road through Roye Gournay and Pont St. Maxence, where the bridge over the Oise had been partially blown up by the enemy; it was promptly repaired, and the army passed the Oise on the 29th and 30th: head-quarters on the latter day were at Louvres. On the 1st of July the army took up a position in front of Le Bourget, the right towards St. Denis, the left upon Bondy. Blucher, with his army, moved by his right on St. Germain, where part of his troops crossed the Seine on

the 30th, and were followed by the remainder on the 1st of July. On the 2d, the Prussians advanced upon Versailles, St. Cloud, and Sevres, with their advance at Montrouge and Issy. On the 3d, the French attacked the corps of Ziethen at Issy, and a smart action took place, when a French flag of truce coming in, hostilities ceased. St. Cloud was fixed upon for the place of treaty, and commissioners were appointed respectively by the French government, the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blucher, by which, on the 6th of July, the allies occupied the barriers of Paris, and the French army retired behind the Loire.

The abdication of Napoleon in favour of his son, and all the political results of this campaign, have been so frequently detailed in the numerous accounts which have been published, that it is unnecessary in this place to recapitulate them; we shall therefore conclude this sketch, by briefly tracing the progress of the allied armies from the banks of the Rhine to the interior of the French empire, commencing with the period of the invasion of Belgium.

On the 15th of June, the Bavarian troops

were concentrating in the neighbourhood of Manheim and Spire; the head-quarters of Prince Wrede at Manheim.

On the 20th, part of the staff of Prince Schwartzenberg left Heidelberg for Bruchsal.

On the 21st, news was received of the defeat of the Prussian army at Ligny, and orders were immediately sent to recall the troops, who had commenced marching on the preceding day; and on the 22d the ringing of bells and firing of cannon announced the victory of Waterloo. On the 24th, Prince Schwartzenberg set off for Manheim; he was followed on the 25th by the Emperors of Russia and Austria. Prince Wrede advanced down the Rhine. On the 28th, Prince Schwartzenberg, together with 30,000 Russians united to his corps, advanced on Spire, whilst the Archduke Ferdinand, with the army of reserve, advanced on Basle and Rheinfels. On the 29th the Hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg, with the troops of Baden and Wirtemberg, crossed the Rhine at Rastadt, and drove the French troops opposed to him into the fortresses of Strasbourg, Schlestadt and Befort, after an action, in which near 1500 men were killed or wounded. On the 30th, the

Archduke Ferdinand passed the Rhine at Basle, with 40,000 men, and the same day arrived at Muhlhausen. On the 1st of July, he entered Colmar, from whence the French had retired on the 29th of June. Meantime Prince Schwartzenberg and the two Emperors proceeded towards Nancy. Prince Wrede took Saarbruck and Saargemund; thus turning the mountains of the Vosges, which might have been defended with a small number of troops. The Archduke Ferdinand, with the army of reserve, passed the Vosges on the 2d of July, at St. Marie-aux-Mines and St. Diey, points which had been strongly intrenched, but which were now totally abandoned. On the 4th of July, the Archduke Ferdinand advanced to Rempervilliers; the Archduke John blockaded Huninguen; Gen. Mazzuchelli blockaded Schelestadt; Prince Colloredo blockaded Strasbourg, where Gen. Rapp had retired with his corps, amounting to near 30,000 men.

On the 5th of July, the Austrian head-quarters were at Charmes; on the 6th, at Mirecourt, and on the 7th, at Neufchateau; on which day, the two Emperors and Prince Schwartzenberg arrived at Nancy, where they were joined by the King of Prussia. On the 8th and 9th, the

Archduke was at Joinville. Thus the reserve had been gradually approaching the main army, and on the following day, (10th), the two head-quarters were united at Brienne. News having been received of the capitulation of Paris, the allied sovereigns, with Prince Schwartzenberg, set off by post for Paris; and the Russian *corps d'armée*, now increased to 50,000 men, branched off to the right, and directed its march upon Soissons. The Bavarians directed their march upon Auxerre, Tonnere, Montbard, and the environs of Sens. The Austrian head-quarters were on the 12th at Troyes, and on the 13th at Sens; whence the army of reserve, and the greater part of the Austrian troops, turned to the left, directing their march southward upon Lyons, to co-operate with Baron Frimont in the reduction of Lyons. The Austro-Italian army passed the Italian frontier in three columns. The 1st, under Frimont, of 60,000 men, by the Simplon, directing its march upon Lyons, and arriving there on the 29th of July. The 2d corps, under Count Bubna, of 50,000 Austrians and Piedmontese, by Mont Cenis; whilst the 3d corps, under Bianchi, with from twenty to thirty thousand troops, proceeded by Monaco and Frejus upon Marseilles. The troops under Marshal Suchet had partial engagements with the

Austrians as they debouched from the Alps, and at Montuel and Maximien, near Lyons, sharp engagements took place on the 12th and 13th of July. News was then received of the cessation of hostilities in the north, and of the capitulation of Paris; and in consequence, Lyons surrendered by capitulation on the 17th, and Marshal Suchet with his army retired to Clermont behind the Allier.

It has been already stated, that it is not the purport of this sketch of the campaign of 1815, to enter into an investigation of its political bearings; the author, therefore, here closes his narrative, which could not be prolonged without touching upon the abdication of Napoleon, the conduct of the French senate, and that of the allied sovereigns; his object having been merely to place the several occurrences of the war in as clear and correct a light as his limited means have enabled him.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Declaration.

Les puissances qui ont signé le traité de Paris, réunies en congrès à Vienne, informées de l'évasion de Napoléon Bonaparte et de son entrée à main armée en France, doivent à leur propre dignité et à l'intérêt de l'ordre social une déclaration solennelle des sentimens que cet évènement leur a fait éprouver.

En rompant ainsi la convention qui l'avait établi à l'île d'Elbe, Bonaparte détruit le seul titre légal auquel son existence se trouvait attachée. En reparaissant en France, avec des projets de troubles et de bouleversemens, il s'est privé lui-même de la protection des lois, et a manifesté, à la face de l'univers, qu'il ne saurait y avoir ni paix ni trève avec lui.

Les puissances déclarent en conséquence, que Napoléon Bonaparte s'est placé hors des relations civiles et sociales, et que, comme ennemi et perturbateur du repos du monde, il s'est livré à la vindicte publique.

Elles déclarent en même temps, que fermement résolus de maintenir intact le traité de Paris du 30 Mai, 1814, et les dispositions sanctionnées par ce traité, et celles qu'elles ont arrêtées ou qu'elles arrêteront encore pour le compléter et le con-

solider, elles emploieront tous leurs moyens et réuniront tous leurs efforts pour que la paix générale, objet des vœux de l'Europe et but constant de leurs travaux, ne soit pas troublée de nouveau, et pour la garantir de tout attentat qui menacerait de replonger les peuples dans les désordres et les malheurs des révolutions.

Et quoiqu'intimement persuadés que la France entière, se ralliant autour de son souverain légitime, fera incessamment rentrer dans le néant cette derni re tentative d'un délire criminel et impuissant, tous les souverains de l'Europe, animés des mêmes sentimens et guidés par les mêmes principes, déclarent que si, contre tout calcul, il pouvait résulter de cet évènement un danger réel quelconque, ils seraient prêts à donner au roi de France et à la nation française, ou à tout autre gouvernement attaqué, dès que la demande en serait formée, les secours nécessaires pour rétablir la tranquillité publique, et à faire cause commune contre tous ceux qui entreprendraient de la compromettre.

La présente déclaration insérée au protocole du congrès réuni à Vienne dans sa séance du 13 Mars, 1815, sera rendue publique.

Fait et certifié véritable par les plénipotentiaires des huit puissances signataires du Traité de Paris.

A Vienne, le 13 Mars, 1815.

Suivent les signatures dans l'ordre alphabétique des cours :

Autriche. Le prince de Metternich, le baron de Wessemberg.

Espagne. P. Gomez Labrador.

France. Le prince Talleyrand, le duc de Dalberg, la Tour du Pin, le comte Alexis de Noailles.

Grand-Bretagne. Wellington, Clancarty, Cathcart, Stewart.

Portugal. Le comte de Palmella, Saldanha, Lobo.

Prusse. Le prince de Hardenberg, le baron de Humboldt.

Russie. Le comte de Rasoumowski, le comte de Stackelberg, le comte de Nesselrode.

Suède. Loewenhielm.

No. II.

Copie d'une Lettre du Prince de Talleyrand au Lord Vicomte Castlereagh, datée de Vienne du 15 *Decembre,* 1814.

MILORD, vous desirez que je vous fasse connaître quelle est mon opinion sur la manière dont je pense que les affaires de Naples devraient être réglées au congrès. Quant à la nécessité de les régler, c'est un point sur lequel il ne peut y avoir un moment d'incertitude dans vos idées comme dans les miennes; car ce serait un sujet de reproche, et je dirai même d'une honte éternelle, si le droit de souveraineté sur un ancien et beau royaume comme celui de Naples, étant contesté, l'Europe unie pour la première fois (et probablement pour la dernière) en un congrès général, laissait indécise une question de cette nature, en sanctionnant en quelque sorte l'usurpation par son silence, et en paraissant approuver l'opinion que le droit le plus juste est celui de la force.

Je n'ai pas besoin de parler à V. Exc. des droits de Ferdinand IV. L'Angleterre n'a jamais cessé de les reconnaître. Dans la guerre dans laquelle il a perdu Naples, l'Angleterre était son alliée. Elle l'a été depuis et elle l'est encore. Elle n'a jamais reconnu le titre que la personne qui gouverne maintenant à Naples a pris, ni le droit que ce titre suppose; c'est pourquoi, en concourant à assurer les droits du roi Ferdinand IV, l'Angleterre n'a qu'une chose simple à faire, qui est de déclarer au congrès, ce qu'elle a toujours reconnu, que Ferdinand IV est le légitime souverain du royaume de Naples.

Peut-être l'Angleterre, ci-devant l'alliée de Ferdinand IV, désire-t-elle l'être encore ? Peut-être peut-elle croire qu'il est de son honneur de l'aider de toutes ses forces pour lui faire reconquérir la couronne dont il avait été reconnu le souverain ? Mais ce n'est pas la une obligation qui puisse être attachée à l'action de reconnaître purement et simplement les droits de ce prince, parce que cette action de reconnaître un droit ne renferme naturellement d'autre obligation que celle de ne rien faire qui soit contraire à ce droit, et de ne soutenir aucune pretention qui puisse être élevée contre lui : elle ne renferme point l'obligation de combattre pour sa défense.

Il est possible que je me fasse illusion ; mais il me paraît infiniment probable qu'une déclaration franche et unanime des puissances de l'Europe, et la certitude obtenue par la personne qui gouverne en ce moment à Naples, qu'elle ne serait soutenue par aucune de ces puissances ; rendraient inutile tout emploi de forces. Mais, si le contraire arrivait, le roi Ferdinand n'aurait besoin que de ceux de ses allies qui jugeraient devoir lui prêter leur secours.

Craindrait-on que dans ce cas la guerre ne s'étendît au-delà des limites du royaume de Naples, et que la tranquillité de l'Italie ne fût de nouveau troublée ? Craindrait-on que des troupes étrang ères ne dussent de nouveau traverser l'Italie ? On peut obvier à ces craintes en stipulant que le royaume de Naples ne pourrait être attaqué par le continent italien. Il paraît que l'Autriche s'est engagée envers celui qui gouverne à Naples à le garantir contre toute attaque de ce côté : si, comme on nous l'assure, l'Autriche n'a pris que cet engagement (et comment pourrait-on supposer que l'empereur ait donne sa garantie contre les droits d'un prince qui est à-la-fois son oncle et son beau-père, à la possession d'un royaume qu'il a perdu en faisant cause commune avec l'Autriche!), elle ne peut-être embarrassée pour concilier avec la justice et ses

sentimens naturels d'affection, les engagemens que des circonstances extraordinaires lui ont fait former.

Il me semble donc que nous pouvons remplir nos devoirs et servir en même temps nos intérêts, en satisfaisant à nos engagemens, par un article qui serait ainsi conçu :

" L'Europe, réunie en congrès, reconnaît S. M. Ferdinand IV. comme roi de Naples. Toutes les puissances s'engagent mutuellement, les unes envers les autres, à n'appuyer directement ou indirectement aucune prétention opposée aux droits qu'il a de prendre ce titre. Mais les troupes que les puissances étrangères à l'Italie et alliées de sa dite majesté pourraient mettre en marche pour le soutien de sa cause, ne pourront traverser l'Italie."

Je me persuade, milord, que V. Exc. est suffisamment autorisée pour qu'elle puisse consentir à cette clause : mais si vous jugiez differemment, et si vous pensiez avoir besoin d'une autorisation plus spéciale, je vous prie de la demander sans délai, comme vous avez bien voulu me promettre de le faire.

Agréez, etc. etc.

(Signé) LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

No. III.

Proclamation of Murat to the Italians.

THE moment is at hand for the accomplishment of grand events. Providence calls you to liberty ; a general cry is heard from the Alps to the straits of Scylla, and that is, LET ITALY BE FREE !"

What right have strangers to rob you of independence, that best and choicest blessing of every nation? What right have they to rule over your beautiful country, and transport

its produce to their own less genial climes? What right have they to make your children subservient to their ambition, and lead them to death far from the graves of their ancestors? Have your ramparts, the Alps, been raised in vain by nature? Are the yet stronger barriers, difference of language, manners, and invincible antipathy of character, unavailing? No! let all foreign dominion fly from Italian soil! You were formerly the masters of the world; and you have expiated this glory by twenty years of oppression. Let your future glory be to have no masters. All mankind should keep within the limits nature has directed: seas and inaccessible mountains are your boundaries—do not wish to extend them; but drive off the stranger who has not respected them, if he does not hasten to return to his own. 80,000 Neapolitans have put themselves under the command of their king, and have sworn to take no rest till Italy is free.—They have already proved they adhere to their oaths.—Let the other states of Italy second these magnanimous endeavours; let those who have carried arms resume them; let the youths learn to handle them; let all noble souls speak liberty to all Italians; let all the population come out en-masse and in every form! The question is, shall Italy be free, or shall she breathe the humble language of slavery for ages yet to come? Let the combat be decisive, and you will insure the happiness of our beautiful country, which, though bloody and mangled, is still worthy the admiration of enlightened men of all nations, of people worthy to be governed by liberal laws, and by princes distinguished for their grandeur, and who rejoice in your enterprise, and will applaud your triumph. Even England, that example of constitutional government, that free people, who glory in fighting for liberty, and lavish their treasure to obtain this object, will not she applaud your efforts? Italians! you have been astonished at your useless appeal to us: perhaps you have

blamed our inactivity while we heard your wishes—but the time was not come—we had not received proofs of the treachery of our enemies; it was just and necessary to try the fallacious promises of your old rulers when they returned, and experience has shown what multitudes of evils have quickly come upon us. I call upon the virtuous and unfortunate citizens of Milan, Bologna, Turin, Venice, Brescia, Modena, Reggio, and others, to witness how many warriors and patriots have been torn from their paternal soil! how many have groaned in their prisons, how many victims of oppression and unheard-of humiliations. Italians, you must be indemnified for those miseries! Unite yourselves! Let a government of your choice, a true national representation, a constitution worthy of the age and you, protect your liberty and property. But your courage must be the pledge of your independence. I summon all heroes to fight by my side. I call on all those who have reflected on the interest of their country, to frame a constitution and laws, which must, hereafter, govern happy and independent Italy.

Signed, JOACHIM NAPOLEON.

MILLET DE VILLENEUVE,
Chief of the Staff.

Rimini, 30th March, 1815.

5. B.

FRENCH FORCES AT QUATRE BRAS.

COMMANDED BY MARSHAL NEY,

16th JUNE.

Corps.	Cavalry.	Force.	Infantry.	Force.	Artill.	Guns.
2d CORPS, Reille.	2d Division, General Piré.	1550	1st Division, General Bachelu. 2d Division, Prince Jerome. 4th Division, General Foy.	4950 7500 5100	770	38
3d CORPS of Cavalry, Kellerman.	11th Division, General L'Heritier. 12th Division, General Roussel.	1560 1240	. . . . .		240	12
Of 1st CORPS, D'Erlon.	1st Division, General Jacquinot.	1650	. . . . .		120	6
Total Cavalry engaged .		6000	Infantry engaged	17,550	1130	56
Remained in Reserve, and not engaged.						
1st CORPS, D'Erlon.	. . . . .		1st Division . . 2d ditto . 3d ditto . . 4th ditto . .	4350 4450 4150 4250	800	40
IMPERIAL GUARD.	Light Cavalry, Lef. Desnouettes.	1400	. . . . .		240	12
Total Cavalry in Reserve .		1400	Infantry . .	17,200	1040	52

Total engaged.			General Total.	
	Men.	Guns.		
Cavalry 6000				
Infantry 17,550	24,680	56		
Artillery 1130			Men.	Guns.
Total in Reserve.			44,320	108
Cavalry 1400				
Infantry 17,200	19,640	52		
Artillery 1040				

FRENCH FORCES AT LIGNY,

COMMANDED BY NAPOLEON, IN PERSON,

16th JUNE.

Corps.	Cavalry.	Force.	Infantry	Force.	Artill.	Gu
3d CORPS, Vandamme.	3d Division, General Domont.	1350	1st Division, General Hubert.	4700	640	
			2d Division, General Berthezene.	4600		
			3d Division, General Le Fol.	4750		
4th CORPS, Gerard.	6th Division, General Morin.	1650	1st Division, General Pecheux.	4000	640	
			2d Division, General Vichery.	4750		
			3d Division, General Hulot.	4250		
Of the 2d CORPS.	. . . . .		3d Division, Girard.	5150	160	
IMPERIAL GUARD.	Heavy Cavalry, General Guyot.	1400	Grenadier Division, General Friant.	4200	1710	
			Chasseur Division, General Morand.	4300		
			Young Guard, General Barrois.	4800		
1st CORPS, Pajol.	4th Division . .	1500	. . . . .		240	
	5th ditto . .	1450				
2d CORPS, Excelmans.	9th ditto . .	1450	. . . . .		240	
	10th ditto . .	1450				
4th CORPS, Milhaud.	13th ditto . .	1650	. . . . .		240	
	14th ditto . .	1490				
Cavalry		13,390	Guns.	45,500	2870	
Infantry		45,500	204			
Artillery		2,870				
Total . . .		61,760 Men, 204 Guns.				

AT LIGNY.

Troops engaged	61,760 Men,	204 Guns.
6th Corps in Re erve . . .	12,920 Men,	38 Guns.
General Total .	74,680 Men,	242 Guns.

5. D.

FRENCH FORCES AT WATERLOO,

COMMANDED BY NAPOLEON, IN PERSON,

18th JUNE.

Corps.	Cavalry.	Force.	Infantry.	Force.	Artill.	Guns.
1st CORPS, D'Erlon.	1st Division, General Jacquinot.	1650	1st Division, G. Alix or G. Quiot.	4350	920	46
			2d Division, General Donzelot.	4450		
			3d Division, General Marcognet.	4150		
			4th Division, General Durutte.	4250		
2d CORPS, Reille.	2d Division, General Piré.	1550	1st Division, Bachelu.	4950	750	38
			2d Division, Prince Jerome.	7500		
			4th Division, General Foy.	5100		
6th CORPS, Lobau.	3d Division, General Domont.	1350	1st Division, General Simmer.	3750	610	30
			2d Division, General Jeannin.	4150		
IMPERIAL GUARD.	Heavy Cavalry, General Guyot.	1400	Grenadiers, General Friant.	4200	1920	96
	Light Cavalry, Desnouettes.	1400	Chasseurs, General Morand.	4300		
			Jeune Garde, General Barrois.	4800		
Of 1st CORPS,	5th Division,	1450	. . . . .		120	6
3d CORPS, Kellerman.	11th Division. 12th Division.	2800	. . . . .		240	12
4th CORPS, Milhaut.	13th Division. 14th Division.	3140	. . . . .		240	12
	Total Cavalry .	14,740	Total Infantry .	55,950	4800	240
	General Total, Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery .			75,500		240

Deduct loss sustained by the 2d Corps, &c. at Quatre Bras, and of the Imperial Guard at Ligny . . . 6000

Remains . 69,500 Men, 240 Guns,
Engaged at Waterloo.

Appendix, No. 4. (A.)

ARMY OF THE NETHERLANDS,

COMMANDED BY FIELD MARSHAL HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

ANGLO-HANOVERIAN ARMY.

BELGIAN ARMY.

RECAPITULATION.

	Cavalry	Infantry	Artillery	Engineers, &c.	Total.	
English	5,962	21,468	1,344	1,400	30,209	Total English.
King's German Legion	3,560	3,352	896		6,808	Total K. G. L.
Hanoverian	1,755	12,200			14,005	Total Hanoverian.
Brunswick	992	7,906			8,898	Total Brunswick.
Belgian	6,400	32,240			38,640	Total Belgian.
	18,669	77,166	2,240	1,400	99,475	Grand Total.

It must be observed, that three of the above Groups, not comprised in the Tables of Forces assembled at Waterloo, on the 18th of June, were in part assembled in a position covering the approach to Brussels, through Hal, and were commanded by Prince Frederic of the Netherlands. The remainder were employed in garrisoning the different fortresses.

S. E.

FRENCH FORCES AT WAVRE,

COMMANDED BY MARSHAL GROUCHY,

18th JUNE.

Corps.	Cavalry.	Foot.	Infantry.	Foot.	Artillery.	Guns.
4th CORPS, Vallmont.			1st Division, General Hulot. 2d Division, General Bonnemains. 3d Division, General Le Tac.	4,500 4,000 4,000	500	24
3d CORPS, Gérard.	4th Division, General Maurin.	2,000	1st Division, General Pajol. 2d Division, General Vichery. 3d Division, General Berlin.	4,000 4,000 4,000	500	24
2d CORPS, Reille.			5th Division, General Girard.	4,000	500	24
1st CORPS, Erlon.	4th Division, General Jacquinot.	1,000			500	24
6th CORPS, Lobau.	5th Division, General Domon.	1,000			500	24
Total Cavalry		4,000	Total Infantry	31,500	3,000	96
				Grand Total	38,500	96

The Corps of Girard of 4000 Men, and 8 Guns, which at the 18th were attached to the Troops at Ligny, were on the 19th left in rear and not engaged.

A TABLE OF THE FRENCH FORCES,

COMMANDED BY THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON, IN PERSON,

WHICH INVADED BELGIUM IN JUNE, 1815.

CAVALRY.					INFANTRY.										GENERAL TOTALS.
Corps.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Men.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Men.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Men.	Divisions.	Regiments.	Men.	
IMPERIAL GUARD.	Division of Cavalry	Heavy Cavalry, General Guyot.	1st Regiment Grenadiers, 4 Squadrons 2d ditto ditto 1st ditto Chasseurs ditto 2d ditto Lancers ditto	800 800 800 800	Division of Grenadiers, General Count Friant.	General Poret, General Guilleminot, General Petit, General Roguet.	1st Regiment, 3 Battalions 2d ditto ditto 3d ditto ditto 4th ditto, ditto in one	1200 1200 1200 1200	Division of Chasseurs, General Count Henrion.	General Cambronne, General Michel, General Pelet, General ———	1st Regt. Chasseurs, 3 Batts. 2d ditto ditto 3d ditto ditto 4th ditto, ditto in one	1200 1200 1200 1200	Division of Young Guard, General Barois.					Imperial Guard. Cavalry . 5,600 Infantry . 12,500
			Total Cavalry of the Guard	3,200			Total Grenadiers of the Guard	4800			Total Chasseurs of the Guard	4800			Total of the Young Guard	4800			18,100
1st CORPS, Lieutenant-General Count D'Erlon.	1st Division, Lieutenant-General Jacquinot.	1st Brigade, General Bonnet. 2d Brigade, General Grandsorgne.	1st Chasseurs 7th ditto 3d Lancers 4th ditto	960 720 720	1st Division, General Allix.	1st Brigade, General Bourgeois. 2d Brigade, General Quiot.	54th Regiment, Line, 4 Battalions 105th ditto, ditto 2d ditto, ditto 108th ditto, ditto	4800 3200 3200 3200	1st Division, General Donzelot.	1st Brigade, General Marcognet. 2d Brigade, General Bourgeois.	13th Light, 4 Battalions 13th Line, ditto 19th ditto, ditto 51st ditto, ditto	3200 3200 3200 3200	2d Division, General Bourgeois.	1st Brigade, General Pegot. 2d Brigade, General Pelletier.	28th Line, 4 Battalions 105th ditto, ditto 2d ditto, ditto 108th ditto, ditto	3200 3200 3200 3200	4th Division, Lieutenant-General Durutte.	1st Brigade, 2d Brigade,	59th Line, 2 Battalions 28th ditto, ditto 95th ditto, ditto 105th ditto, ditto	2400 1600 1600 1600	First Corps. Cavalry . 1960 Infantry . 12,400
			Total Cavalry, 1st Division	1680			Total Infantry, 1st Division	4800			Total Infantry, 2d Division	4800			Total Infantry, 2d Division	4800			Total Infantry, 4th Division	4800	18,200
2d CORPS, Lieutenant-General Count Reille.	2d Division, Lieutenant-General Foy.	1st Brigade, General Bachelu. 2d Brigade, General Husson.	1st Chasseurs 7th ditto 3d Lancers 4th ditto	960 720 720	1st Division, Lieutenant-General Bachelu.	1st Brigade, General Bachelu. 2d Brigade, General Campt.	61st Line, 2 Battalions 82d ditto, ditto 126 ditto, ditto Detach. ditto, ditto	1600 1600 1600 1600	2d Division, Lieutenant-General Jerome Napoleon.	1st Brigade, General Soye. 2d Brigade, General Soye.	1st and 3d Light, 4 Battalions 1st ditto, 2 ditto 1st ditto, ditto 3d ditto, ditto	3200 1600 1600 1600	5th Division, Prince Jerome Napoleon.	1st Brigade, General Bauduin. 2d Brigade, General Soye.	1st Light, 2 Battalions 1st Line, 2 ditto 1st ditto, ditto 3d ditto, ditto	1600 1600 1600 1600	6th Division, Lieutenant-General Foy.	1st Brigade, 2d Brigade,	4th Light, 2 Battalions 3d Line, 2 ditto 32d ditto, ditto 108th ditto, ditto	1600 2400 1600 2400	Second Corps. Cavalry . 1960 Infantry . 12,700
			Total Cavalry, 2d Division	1680			Total Infantry, 1st Division	4800			Total Infantry, 3d Division	4800			Total Infantry, 3d Division	4800			Total Infantry, 6th Division	4800	14,500
3d CORPS, Lieutenant-General Count Valmenier.	3d Division, Lieutenant-General Domon.	1st Brigade, General Subervie.	4th Chasseurs 9th ditto	960 480	1st Division, Lieutenant-General Habert.	1st Brigade, General Grosjean. 2d Brigade, General Pelapratt.	54th Line, 2 Battalions 96th ditto, ditto 85th ditto, ditto 2d ditto, ditto	1600 1600 1600 1600	3d Division, Lieutenant-General Berthezene.	1st Brigade, General Cottin. 2d Brigade, General Lagarde.	14th Line, 2 Battalions 24th ditto, ditto 4th ditto, ditto 96th ditto, ditto	1600 1600 1600 1600	4th Division, Lieutenant-General Le Vil.	1st Brigade, General Berlon. 2d Brigade, General Corsin.	51st Light, 2 Battalions 2d Line, 2 ditto 27th ditto, ditto 63d ditto, ditto	1600 1600 1600 1600				Third Corps. Cavalry . 1200 Infantry . 14,400
			Total Cavalry, 3d Division	1440			Total Infantry, 1st Division	4800			Total Infantry, 4th Division	4800			Total Infantry, 4th Division	4800				14,400
4th CORPS, Lieutenant-General Count Bulow.	4th Division, Lieutenant-General Maller.	1st Brigade, General Tuffin. 2d Brigade, General Hiller.	12th Chasseurs 30th ditto Detachments	960 480	1st Division, Lieutenant-General Pirch.	1st Brigade, General Pirch. 2d Brigade, General Steinmetz.	30th Line, 3 Battalions Detachments, ditto	2400 1600	2d Division, Lieutenant-General Tippelskirch.	1st Brigade, General Henkel. 2d Brigade, General Ryssel.	1st Line, 3 Battalions 2d ditto, ditto Detachments, ditto	2400 1600 1600	3d Division, Major-General Borke.	1st Brigade, General Borke. 2d Brigade, General Tornaco.	30th Line, 3 Battalions 113th ditto, ditto purch. ditto, ditto 30th ditto, ditto	2400 1600 1600 1600				Fourth Corps. Cavalry . 1600 Infantry . 12,000
			Total Cavalry, 4th Division	1440			Total Infantry, 1st Division	4000			Total Infantry, 2d Division	4000			Total Infantry, 3d Division	4800				14,000
4th CORPS, Lieutenant-General Count Ziethen.					2d Division, Lieutenant-General Jamin.	1st Brigade, General Steinmetz. 2d Brigade, General Tippelskirch.	1st Light, 2 battalions 1st Line, ditto 27th ditto, ditto 133d ditto, ditto	1200 1600 1600 1600	3d Division, Lieutenant-General Borcke.	1st Brigade, General Borcke. 2d Brigade, General Tornaco.	1st Light, 2 battalions 30th Line, 3 ditto Detachments, ditto	1200 2400 1600	4th Division, Lieutenant-General Jamin.	1st Brigade, General Tuffin. 2d Brigade, General Hiller. Detached Corps.	12th Light, 2 battalions 30th Line, 3 ditto Detachments, ditto	1200 2400 1600				Fifth Corps. Cavalry . 1600 Infantry . 12,000
							Total Infantry, 1st Division	4800			Total Infantry, 2d Division	4800			Total Infantry, 3d Division	4800				14,000

FOUR CORPS, FORMING THE RESERVE CAVALRY, COMMANDED BY MARSHAL COUNT GROUCHY.

1. Corps, commanded by General Count Pajol.					II. Corps, commanded by General Count Exelmans.				III. Corps, commanded by General Count Kellermann.				IV. Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Count Milhaud.				GENERAL TOTALS.
Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Men.		Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Men.	Division.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Men.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Men.	
1st Division, Lieutenant-General Soult.	1st Brigade, Gen. St. Laurent. 2d Brigade, General Corbett.	1st Hussars 6th ditto 4th ditto	1200 800		5th Division, Lieutenant-General Jacquinot.	1st Brigade, General Berton. 2d Brigade, General Piquerez.	5th Dragoons 11th ditto 10th ditto 20th ditto	800 800 800 800	11th Division, Lieutenant-General Wathier.	1st Brigade, General Piquet. 2d Brigade, General Guyeux.	5th Dragoons 7th ditto 9th Cuirassiers 11th ditto	800 800 800 800	12th Division, Lieutenant-General Wathier.	1st Brigade, General Roussel. 2d Brigade, General Travers.	1st Cuirassiers 4th ditto 7th ditto 12th ditto	800 800 800 800	Fourth Corps. Cavalry . 3200 Infantry . 12,000
2d Division, Lieutenant-General Subervie.	1st Brigade, General Colbert. 2d Brigade, General Merlin.	1st Lancers 9th ditto 12th Chasseurs	800 800 800		6th Division, Lieutenant-General Chastel.	1st Brigade, General Schwartz. 2d Brigade, General Maurin.	6th Hussars 13th ditto 14th ditto 15th ditto	800 800 800 800	12th Division, Lieutenant-General Roussel.	1st Brigade, General Chemineau. 2d Brigade, General Berny.	1st Carabineers 2d ditto 5th Cuirassiers 8th ditto	800 800 800 800	13th Division, Lieutenant-General Delort.	1st Brigade, General Farine. 2d Brigade, General Vial.	6th ditto 8th ditto 9th ditto 10th ditto	800 800 800 800	Corps . 3200 Corps . 3140
Total, 1st Corps of Cavalry . 3200					Total, 2d Corps of Cavalry . 3200				Total, 3d Corps of Cavalry . 3200				Total of 4th Corps of Cavalry . 3147				12,740

ARTILLERY, ENGINEERS, &c.

Corps.	Number of Batteries. Horse Artl.	Foot Artl.	No. of Men.	No. of Guns.	Engineers and Pontoneers.
Imperial Guard	2	6	1200	36	Distributed with the different Corps, 1200
First Corps d'Armée	1	6	800	36	
Second Corps d'Armée	1	6	800	36	
Third Corps d'Armée	1	6	800	36	
Fourth Corps d'Armée	1	6	800	36	
Fifth Corps d'Armée	1	6	800	36	
First Corps of Cavalry	1	—	317	12	
Second Corps of Cavalry	1	—	317	12	
Third Corps of Cavalry	1	—	317	12	
Fourth Corps of Cavalry	1	—	317	12	
	11	36	7008	324	1200

RECAPITULATION.

Corps.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.
Imperial Guard	5600	12,500	18,100
First Corps d'Armée	1960	12,400	14,360
Second Corps d'Armée	1960	12,700	14,660
Third Corps d'Armée	1200	14,400	15,600
Fourth Corps d'Armée	1600	12,000	13,600
Fifth Corps d'Armée		12,000	13,600
First Corps of Cavalry	3200		3200
Second Corps of Cavalry	3200		3200
Third Corps of Cavalry	3200		3200
Fourth Corps of Cavalry	3140		3140
	26,060	86,000	112,260

26 Corps, Squadrons,	112,260	Cavalry and Infantry
	7008	Artillerymen,
	7200	Engineers, Pontoneers, &c. &c.
Making a Total of	126,468	Men, with 344 Pieces of Cannon.

Appendix, No. 4. (B.)

A TABLE OF THE ALLIED TROOPS ASSEMBLED AT QUATRE BRAS, ON THE 16th OF JUNE, 1815.

CAVALRY.		INFANTRY of the 1st Corps.			INFANTRY of the 2d Corps.			INFANTRY of the Reserve.			Total.	Hours of arrival.
Brigades.	Force.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Force.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Force.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Force.		
		2d Division of Netherlands.	3d Brigade	2000							5200	At Quatre Bras early in the morning.
			Nassau Brigade	1200								
		Part of 3d Division of Netherlands.	4th Brigade	2000								
		3d English Division.	5th English Brigade	2107							6203	Arrived at Quatre Bras at 4 p.m.
			2d K. G. L. Brigade	1704								
			1st Hanoverian Brigade	2472								
Brunswick	900							1st Division, Brunswick Oels.	1st Brigade	2500	13,915	Arrived at Quatre Bras at 2 p. m.
2d Belgian	1200								2d ditto	2500		
								5th English Division.	5th English Brigade	2306		
									9th ditto, ditto	2150		
									5th Hanoverian Brigade	2260		
		1st English Division.	1st Brigade Guards.	1972							3913	Arrived at Quatre Bras at 6 p. m.
			2d ditto, ditto	1941								
Cavalry	2100	Of the 1st Corps		15,296				Of the Reserve		11815	29,311	

RECAPITULATION.

	Cavd.	Inf.	Force.	
English		10,575	10,575	Total English.
King's Ger. Legion		1704	1704	Total King's German Legion.
Hanoverians		4732	4732	Total Hanoverians.
Brunswick	900	5000	5900	Total Brunswick.
Belgians	1200	5200	6400	Total Belgian.
	2100	27,211	29,311	Grand Total.

Appendix, No. 4. (C.)

A TABLE OF THE WHOLE ALLIED TROOPS AT THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 18th OF JUNE, 1815.

CAVALRY.		1st CORPS, General His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange.			2d CORPS, Lieutenant-General Lord Hill.			RESERVE.			Artil.	Staff Engrs.	GRAND TOTAL.
Brigade.	Force.	Divisions.	Brigade.	Force.	Divisions.	Brigades.	Force.	Divisions.	Brigade.	Force.	Force.	Force.	Forces at Waterloo, includ. loss at Q. Bras.
1st Brigade	1176	1st Division, Major-Gen. Cooke.	1st Brigade Guards	1972	2d Division, Lieut.-General Clinton.	3d Brigade	2541	5th Division, Lieutenant-General Picton.	5th Brigade	2396	4030	1400	59,583
2d ditto	1168		2d ditto, ditto	1941		1st ditto, K. G. L.	1799		9th ditto	2159			
3d ditto	1325	3d Division, Lieut.-General Alten.	5th English Brigade	2107		3d Hanoverian Brigade	2235		5th Hanoverian Brigade	2260			
4th ditto	1159		2d Brigade K. G. L.	1704	Part of the 4th Division,	4th Brigade	1034	Part of 6th Division.	Part of 10th Brigade	2000			
5th ditto	769		1st Hanoverian Brigade	2472				Brunswick Division.	1st Brigade	5000	734		
6th ditto	1279	2d Division of Netherlands, Lieut.-Gen. Perponcher.	3d Brigade Netherlands	2000					2d ditto				
7th ditto	972		Nassau Brigade	2200									
1st Hanoverian Brigade	1135	3d Division of Netherlands, Lieut.-General Collaert.	4th Brigade Netherlands	2000									
1st Netherlands Brigade	1200		5th ditto, ditto	2000									
2d ditto, ditto	1200												
Brunswick Brigade	900												
Total Cavalry	12,283	The whole of the 1st Corps		18,396	Of the 2d Corps		9260	Of the Reserve		13,815	5434	1400	59,583

RECAPITULATION.

	Cavl.	Inf.	Artil.	Staff.	Force.	GRAND TOTAL.
English	5897	16,310	4034	1400	28,111	59,583
King's Ger. Legion	2041	3494	586		6121	
Hanoverians	1135	6967			8102	
Brunswick	900	5000	734		5900	
Belgian	2400	8200			10,600	
	12,283	40,471	5434	1400		59,583
Deduct the loss at Quatre Bras						4500 kd. and wd.
And we have the Total Force present at Waterloo						55,083 Men.

No. VI.

Proclamation of Napoleon to the French Army.

Soldats,

C'est aujourd'hui l'anniversaire de Marengo et de Friedland, qui décidèrent deux fois du destin de l'Europe. Alors, comme après Austerlitz, comme après Wagram, nous fûmes trop généreux; nous crûmes aux protestations et aux sermens des princes que nous laissâmes sur le trône. Aujourd'hui, cependant, coalisés entre eux, ils en veulent à l'indépendence et aux droits les plus sacrés de la France. Ils ont commencé la plus injuste des agressions; marchons à leur rencontre: eux et nous, ne sommes plus les mêmes hommes!

Soldats, à Jéna, contre ces mêmes Prussiens aujourd'hui si arrogans, vous étiez un contre trois, et à Montmirail un contre six. Que ceux d'entre vous qui ont été prisonniers des Anglais, vous fassent le récit de leurs pontons et des maux affreux qu'ils y ont soufferts.

Les Saxons, les Belges, les Hanovriens, les soldats de la confédération du Rhin gémissent d'être obligés de prêter leurs bras à la cause de princes ennemis de la justice et des droits de tous les peuples. Ils savent que cette coalition est insatiable. Après avoir dévoré douze millions de Polonais, douze millions d'Italiens, un million de Saxons, six millions de Belges, elle devra dévorer les états du second ordre de l'Allemagne.

Les insensés! un moment de prospérité les aveugle; l'oppression et l'humiliation du peuple français sont hors de leur pouvoir.

S'ils entrent en France, ils y trouveront leur tombeau.

Soldats, nous avons des marches forcées à faire, des

batailles à livrer, des périls à courir; mais, avec de la constance, la victoire sera à nous; les droits de l'homme et le bonheur de la patrie seront reconquis. Pour tout Français qui a du cœur, le moment est arrivé de vaincre ou de périr.

Signé, NAPOLEON.

14 Juin, 1815.

No. VII.

ORDRE DU JOUR.

Avesne, le 13 Juin, 1815.

Position de l'armée le 14.

Le grand quartier général à Beaumont. L'infanterie de la garde impériale sera bivaquée à un quart de lieue en avant de Beaumont, et formera trois lignes; la jeune garde, les chasseurs, et les grenadiers. M. le duc de Trévise reconnaîtra l'emplacement de ce camp: il aura soin que tout soit à sa place; artillerie, ambulance, équipage, etc.

Le premier régiment de grenadiers à pied se rendra à Beaumont.

Le cavalerie de la garde impériale sera placée en arrière de Beaumont; mais les corps les plus éloignés n'en doivent pas être à une lieue.

Le deuxième corps prendra position à Laire, c'est-à-dire, le plus près possible de la frontière, sans la dépasser. Les quatre divisions de ce corps d'armée seront réunies et bivaqueront sur deux ou quatre lignes; le quartier général au milieu; la cavalerie en avant, éclairant tous les débouchés, mais aussi sans dépasser la frontière, et la faisant respecter par les partisans ennemis qui voudraient la violer.

Les bivouacs seront placés de manière que les feux ne puissent être aperçus de l'ennemi : les généraux empêcheront que personne ne s'écarte du camp : ils s'assureront que la troupe est pourvue de cinquante cartouches par homme, quatre jours de pain, et une demi-livre de riz ; que l'artillerie et les ambulances sont en bon état, et les feront placer à leur ordre de bataille. Ainsi le deuxième corps sera disposé à se mettre en marche le 15 à trois heures du matin, si l'ordre en est donné, pour se porter sur Charleroi, et y arriver avant neuf heures.

Le premier corps prendra position à Solre-sur-Sambre, et il bivaquera aussi sur plusieurs lignes, observant, ainsi que le deuxième corps, que ses feux ne puissent être aperçus de l'ennemi ; que personne ne s'écarte du camp, et que les généraux s'assurent de l'état des munitions, des vivres de la troupe, et que l'artillerie et les ambulances soient placées à leur ordre de bataille.

Le premier corps se tiendra également prêt à partir le 15, à trois heures du matin, pour suivre le mouvement du deuxième corps ; de manière que, dans la journée d'après-demain, ces deux corps manœuvrent dans la même direction, et se protégent.

Le troisième corps prendra demain position à une lieue en avant de Beaumont, le plus près possible de la frontière, sans cependant la dépasser, ni souffrir qu'elle soit violée par aucun parti ennemi. Le général Vandamme tiendra tout le monde à son poste, recommandera que les feux soient cachés, et qu'ils ne puissent être aperçus de l'ennemi. Il se conformera d'ailleurs à ce qui est prescrit au deuxième corps pour les munitions, les vivres, l'artillerie, et les ambulances, et pour être prêt à se mettre en mouvement le 15 à trois heures du matin.

Le sixième corps se portera en avant de Beaumont ; et sera bivaqué sur deux lignes, à un quart de lieue du troisième

corps. M. le comte le Lobau choisira l'emplacement, et il fera observer les dispositions générales qui sont prescrites par le présent ordre.

M le maréchal Grouchy portera les premier, deuxième, troisième, et quatrième corps de cavalerie, en avant de Beaumont, et les établira au bivouac entre cette ville et Walcourt, faisant également respecter la frontière, empêchant que personne ne la dépasse, et qu'on se laisse voir, ni que les feux puissent être aperçus de l'ennemi; et il se tiendra prêt à partir après demain, à trois heures du matin, s'il en reçoit l'ordre, pour se porter sur Charleroi, et faire l'avant-garde de l'armée.

Il recommandera aux généraux de s'assurer si tous les cavaliers sont pourvus de cartouches, si leurs armes sont en bon état, et s'ils ont pour quatre jours de pain, et la demi-livre de riz qui ont été ordonnés.

L'équipage de ponts sera bivaqué derrière le sixième corps, et en avant de l'infanterie de la garde impériale.

Le parc central d'artillerie sera en arrière de Beaumont.

L'armée de la Moselle prendra demain position en avant de Philippeville. M. le comte Gérard la disposera de manière à pouvoir partir après demain, le 15, à trois heures du matin, pour joindre le troisième corps, et appuyer son mouvement sur Charleroi, suivant le nouvel ordre qui lui sera donné; mais le général Gérard aura soin de se bien garder sur son flanc droit, et en avant de lui, sur toutes les directions de Charleroi et de Namur. Si l'armée de la Moselle a des pontons à sa suite, le général Gérard les fera avancer le plus près possible, afin de pouvoir en disposer.

Tous les corps d'armée feront marcher en tête les sapeurs, et les moyens de passage que les généraux auront réunis.

Les sapeurs de la garde impériale, les ouvriers de la marine, et les sapeurs de la réserve, marcheront après le sixième corps, et en tête de la garde.

Tous les corps marcheront dans le plus grand ordre et serrés. Dans le mouvement sur Charleroi, on sera disposé à profiter de tous les passages pour écraser les corps ennemis qui voudraient attaquer l'armée ou qui manœuvreraient contre elle.

Il n'y aura à Beaumont que le grand quartier général. Aucun autre ne devra y être établi, et la ville sera dégagée de tout embarras. Les anciens règlemens sur le quartier général et les équipages, sur l'ordre de marche, et la police des voitures et bagages, et sur les blanchisseuses et vivandières, seront remis et vigueur. Il sera fait à ce sujet un ordre général; mais, en attendant, MM. les généraux commandant les corps d'armée, prendront des dispositions en conséquence; et M. le grand prévôt fera exécuter ces règlemens. L'empereur ordonne que toutes les dispositions contenues dans le présent ordre soient tenues secrètes par MM. les généraux.

Par ordre de l'empereur,
Le maréchal d'empire, major général,
(Signé) DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. VIII.

ORDRE DU MOUVEMENT.

Beaumont, 14th Juin, 1815.

DEMAIN, le 15, à deux heures et demie du matin, la division de cavalerie légère du général Vandamme montera à cheval, et se portera sur la route de Charleroi: elle enverra des partis dans toutes les directions, pour éclairer le pays, et enlever les postes ennemis; mais chacun de ces partis sera au moins de

cinquante hommes. Avant de mettre en marche la division, le général Vandamme s'assurera qu'elle est pourvue de cartouches.

A la même heure, le lieutenant général Pajol réunira le premier corps de cavalerie, et suivra la mouvement de la division du général Domont, qui sera sous les ordres du général Pajol. Les divisions du premier corps de cavalerie ne fourniront point de détachemens; ils seront pris dans la troisième division. Le général Domont laissera sa batterie d'artillerie, pour marcher après le premier bataillon du troisième corps d'infanterie. Le lieutenant général Vandamme lui donnera des ordres en conséquence.

Le lieutenant général Vandamme fera battre la diane à deux heures et demie du matin; à trois heures il mettra en marche son corps d'armée, et le dirigera sur Charleroi: la totalité de ses bagages et embarras seront parqués en arrière, et ne se mettront en marche qu'après que le sixième corps et la garde impériale auront passé; ils seront sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, qui les réunira à ceux du sixième corps de la garde impériale et du grand quartier général, et leur donnera des ordres de mouvement.

Chaque division du troisième corps d'armée aura avec elle sa batterie et ses ambulances; toute autre voiture qui serait dans les rangs sera brûlée.

M. le comte de Lobau fera battre la diane à trois heures et demie, et il mettra en marche le sixième corps d'armée à quatre heures, pour suivre le mouvement du général Vandamme, et l'appuyer; il fera observer le même ordre de marche pour les troupes, l'artillerie, les ambulances, et les bagages, qui est prescrit au troisième corps.

Les bagages du sixième corps seront réunis à ceux du troisième, sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, ainsi qu'il est dit.

La jeune garde battra la diane à quatre heures et demie, et se mettra en marche à cinq heures; elle suivra le mouvement du sixième corps sur la route de Charleroi.

Les chasseurs à pied de la garde battront la diane à cinq heures, et se mettront en marche à cinq heures et demie, pour suivre le mouvement de la jeune garde.

Les grenadiers à pied de la garde battront la diane à cinq heures et demie, et partiront à six heures, pour suivre le mouvement des chasseurs à pied. Le même ordre de marche, pour l'artillerie, les ambulances, et les bagages, prescrit pour le troisième corps d'infanterie, sera observé dans la garde impériale.

Les bagages de la garde seront réunis à ceux des troisième et sixième corps d'armée, sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, qui les fera mettre en mouvement.

M. le maréchal Grouchy fera monter à cheval, à cinq heures et demie du matin, celui des trois autres corps de cavalerie qui sera le plus près de la route, et lui fera suivre le mouvement sur Charleroi. Les deux autres corps partiront successivement à une heure d'intervalle l'un de l'autre; mais M. le maréchal Grouchy aura soin de faire marcher le cavalerie sur les chemins latéraux de la route principale que la colonne d'infanterie suivra, afin d'éviter l'encombrement; et aussi pour que sa cavalerie observe un meilleur ordre. Il prescrira que la totalité des bagages restent en arrière, parqués et réunis jusqu'au moment où le vaguemestre général leur donnera l'ordre d'avancer.

M. le comte Reille fera battre la diane à deux heures et demie du matin, et il mettra en marche le deuxième corps à trois heures; il le dirigera sur Marchiennes-au-Pont, où il fera en sorte d'être rendu avant neuf heures du matin; il fera garder tous les ponts de la Sambre, afin que personne ne passe. Les postes qu'il laissera seront successivement relevés par le

premier corps; mais il doit tâcher de prévenir l'ennemi à ces ponts pour qu'ils ne soient pas détruits, surtout celui de Marchiennes, par lequel il sera probablement dans le cas de déboucher, et qu'il faudrait faire aussitôt réparer, s'il avait été endommagé.

A Thuin et à Marchiennes, ainsi que dans tous les villages sur sa route, M. le comte Reille interrogera les habitans, afin d'avoir des nouvelles des positions et forces des armées ennemies; il fera aussi prendre les lettres dans les bureaux de poste, et les dépouillera, pour faire parvenir aussitôt à l'empereur les renseignemens qu'il aura obtenus.

M. le comte d'Erlon mettra en marche le premier corps à trois heures du matin, et il le dirigera aussi sur Charleroi, en suivant le mouvement du deuxième corps, duquel il gagnera la gauche le plutôt possible, pour le soutenir et l'appuyer au besoin. Il tiendra une brigade de cavalerie en arrière, pour se couvrir et pour maintenir par de petits détachemens, ses communications avec Maubeuge; il enverra des partis en avant de cette place, dans les directions de *Mons* et de *Binch*, jusqu'à la frontière, pour avoir des nouvelles des ennemis, et en rendre compte aussitôt. Ces partis auront soin de ne pas se compromettre et de ne point dépasser la frontière.

M. le comte d'Erlon fera occuper Thuin par une division; et si le pont de cette ville était détruit, il le ferait aussitôt réparer, en même temps qu'il fera tracer et exécuter, immédiatement une tête de pont sur la rive gauche. La division qui sera à Thuin gardera aussi le pont de l'abbaye d'*Alnes*, où M. le comte d'Erlon fera également construire une tête de pont, sur la rive gauche.

Le même ordre de marche prescrit pour le troisième corps, pour l'artillerie, les ambulances et les bagages, sera observé aux deuxième et premier corps, qui feront réunir leurs ba-

gages, et marcher à la gauche du premier corps, sous les ordres du vaguemestre le plus ancien.

Le quatrième corps (armée de la Moselle) a reçu ordre de prendre aujourd'hui position en avant de Philippeville: si son mouvement est opéré, et si les divisions qui composent ce corps d'armée sont réunies, M. le lieutenant général Gérard les mettra en marche demain, à trois heures du matin, et les dirigera sur Charleroi*; il aura soin de se tenir à hauteur du troisième corps, avec lequel il communiquera, afin d'arriver à peu près en même temps devant Charleroi. Mais le général Gérard fera éclairer sa droite et tous les débouchés qui vont sur Namur; il marchera serré en ordre de bataille, fera laisser à Philippeville tous ses bagages et embarras, afin que son corps d'armée, se trouvant plus léger, soit plus à même de manœuvrer.

Le général Gérard donnera ordre à la quatorzième division de cavalerie, qui a dû arriver aujourd'hui à Philippeville, de suivre le mouvement de son corps d'armée sur Charleroi, où cette division joindra le quatrième corps de cavalerie.

Les lieutenans généraux Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, et Pajol, se mettront en communication par de fréquens partis, et ils régleront leur marche de manière à arriver en masse et ensemble devant Charleroi: ils mettront, autant que possible, à l'avant-garde, les officiers qui parlent flamand, pour interroger les habitans et en prendre des renseignemens; mais ces officiers s'annonceront comme commandans de partis, sans dire que l'armée est en arrière.

Les lieutenans généraux Reille, Vandamme, et Gérard, feront marcher tous les sapeurs de leur corps d'armée, (ayant avec eux des moyens pour réparer les ponts), après le pre-

* Le général Gérard reçut plus tard un nouvel ordre qui lui prescrivit de passer, avec son corps, la Sambre au Châtelet.

mier régiment d'infanterie légère; et ils donneront l'ordre aux officiers du génie de faire réparer les mauvais passages, ouvrir des communications latérales, et placer des ponts sur les courans d'eau où l'infanterie devrait se mouiller pour les franchir.

Les marins, les sapeurs de la garde, et les sapeurs de la réserve, marcheront après le premier régiment du troisième corps; les lieutenans généraux Rogniat et Haxo seront à leur tête: ils n'amèneront avec eux que deux ou trois voitures: le surplus du parc du génie marchera à la gauche du troisième corps. Si on rencontre l'ennemi, ces troupes ne seront point engagées, mais les généraux Rogniat et Haxo les emploieront aux travaux de passages de rivière, de têtes de pont, de réparations de chemin, et d'ouvertures de communication, etc La cavalerie de la garde suivra le mouvement sur Charleroi, et partira à huit heures.

L'empereur sera à l'avant-garde sur la route de Charleroi. M.M. les lieutenans généraux auront soin d'envoyer à sa majesté de fréquens rapports sur leurs mouvemens et les renseignemens qu'ils auront recueillis; ils sont prévenus que l'intention de sa majesté est d'avoir passé la Sambre avant midi, et de porter l'armée à la rive gauche de cette rivière.

L'équipage des ponts sera divisé en deux sections: la première section se subdivisera en trois parties, chacune de cinq pontons et cinq bateaux d'avant-garde, pour jeter trois ponts sur la Sambre; il y aura à chacune de ces subdivisions une compagnie de pontonniers; la première section marchera à la suite du parc du génie, après le troisième corps.

La deuxième section restera avec le parc de réserve d'artillerie, à la colonne des bagages; elle aura avec elle la quatrième compagnie de pontonniers; les équipages de l'empereur, et les bagages du grand quartier général seront réunis, et se mettront en marche à dix heures. Aussitôt qu'ils seront passés, le vaguemestre général fera partir les équipages de la

garde impériale, du troisième corps, et du sixième corps ; en même temps il enverra ordre à la colonne d'equipages de la réserve de la cavalerie, de se mettre en marche, et de suivre la direction que la cavalerie aura prise. Les ambulances de l'armée suivront le quartier général, et marcheront à la tête des bagages ; mais, dans aucun cas, ces bagages, ainsi que les parcs de réserve de l'artillerie, et la deuxième section de l'équipage de ponts, ne s'approcheront à plus de trois lieues de l'armée, à moins d'ordre du major général, et ils ne passeront la Sambre, aussi, que par ordre.

Le vaguemestre général formera les divisions de ces bagages, et il y mettra des officiers pour les commander, afin de pouvoir en détacher ce qui sera ensuite appelé au quartier général, ou pour le service des officiers.

L'intendant général fera réunir à cette colonne d'équipages la totalité des bagages et transports de l'administration, auxquels il sera assigné un rang dans la colonne. Les voitures qui seront en retard prendront la gauche, et ne pourront sortir du rang qui leur sera donné que par ordre du vaguemestre général.

L'empereur ordonne que toutes les voitures d'équipages qui seront trouvées dans les colonnes d'infanterie, de cavalerie, ou d'artillerie, soient brûlées, ainsi que les voitures de la colonne des équipages qui quitteront leur rang, et intervertiront leur marche, sans la permission expresse du vaguemestre général.

A cet effet, il sera mis un détachement de cinquante gendarmes à la disposition du vaguemestre général, qui est responsable, ainsi que tous les officiers de la gendarmerie et les gendarmes, de l'exécution de ces dispositions, desquelles le succès de la campagne peut dépendre.

Par ordre de l'empereur,

Le maréchal d'empire, major général,

(Signé) LE DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. IX.

A. M. Le Marechal Compte de Grouchy.

(Porté par M. Hirne, officier d'état-major.)

ORDRE DE MOUVEMENT DU 16.

Charleroi, le 16 Juin, 1815.

MONSIEUR le maréchal, l'empereur ordonne que vous vous mettiez en marche avec les premier, deuxième, et quatrième corps de cavalerie, et que vous les dirigiez sur Sombref, où vous prendrez position. Je donne pareil ordre à M. le lieutenant-général Vandamme, pour le troisième corps d'infanterie, et à M. le lieutenant-général Gérard, pour le quatrième corps; et je préviens ces deux généraux qu'ils sont sous vos ordres, et qu'ils doivent vous envoyer immédiatement des officiers pour vous instruire de leur marche et prendre des instructions. Je leur dis cependant que, lorsque sa majesté sera présente, ils pourront recevoir d'elle des ordres directs, et qu'ils doivent continuer à m'envoyer les rapports de service et états qu'ils ont coutume de fournir.

Je préviens aussi M. le général Gérard que, dans son mouvement, sur Sombref, il doit laisser la ville de Fleurus à gauche, afin d'éviter l'encombrement; ainsi, vous lui donnerez une direction pour qu'il marche d'ailleurs bien réuni, à portée du troisième corps, et soit en mesure de concourir à l'attaque de Sombref, si l'ennemi fait résistance.

Vous donnerez aussi des instructions en conséquence à M. le lieutenant-général comte Vandamme.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que M. le comte de Valmy a reçu un ordre de se rendre à Gosselies avec le troisième

corps de cavalerie, où il sera à la disposition de M. le prince de la Moscowa. Le premier régiment de hussards rentrera dans la journée au premier corps de cavalerie; je prendrai à ce sujet les ordres de l'empereur.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que M. le maréchal prince de la Moscowa reçoit ordre de se porter, avec le premier et le deuxième corps d'infanterie, et le troisième de cavalerie, à l'intersection des chemins dits les Trois-Bras, sur la route de Bruxelles, et qu'il détachera un fort corps à Marbais, pour se lier avec vous sur Sombref, et seconder au besoin vos opérations.

Aussitôt que vous vous serez rendus maître de Sombref, il faudra envoyer une avant-garde à Gembloux, et faire reconnaître toutes les directions qui aboutissent à Sombref, particulièrement la grande route de Namur, en même temps que vous établirez vos communications avec le maréchal Ney.

La garde impériale se dirige sur Fleurus.

Par ordre de l'empereur:
Le major-général,
(Signé) LE DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. X.

A M. Le Comte Gerard.

(Porté par M. Crova.

Charleroi, le 16 Juin, 1815.

MONSIEUR le comte, l'empereur ordonne que vous mettiez en marche le quatrième corps d'armée, et que vous le dirigiez sur Sombref, en laissant Fleurus à gauche, afin d'éviter l'encom-

brement. Je vous préviens que l'intention de sa majesté est que vous preniez les ordres de M. le maréchal Grouchy, comme commandant l'aile droite de l'armée; ainsi vous l'instruirez de votre mouvement. Vous enverrez près de lui sur-le-champ un officier pour lui demander des ordres, sans cependant retarder votre marche. M. le maréchal Grouchy doit se trouver en ce moment près de Fleurus.

Vous ne recevrez des ordres directs de l'empereur que lorsque sa majesté sera présente; mais vous continuerez à m'adresser vos rapports et états ainsi qu'il est établi.

Le major-général de l'armée,

(Signé) LE DUC LE DALMATIE.

No. XI.

A M. Le Comte Vandamme.

(Porté par M. Guyardin.)

Charleroi, le 16 Juin, 1815.

M. LE GENERAL, l'empereur ordonne que vous vous mettiez en marche avec le troisième corps, pour vous diriger sur Sombref, où le quatrième corps et le corps de réserve de cavalerie vont se rendre également. Sa majesté ordonne aussi que vous preniez les ordres de M. le maréchal Grouchy, comme commandant d'une aile de l'armée; ainsi vous l'instruirez de votre mouvement, et vous lui enverrez sur-le-champ un officier pour lui demander ses ordres, sans cependant retarder votre marche. M. le comte Grouchy doit être en ce moment du côté de Fleurus. Vous ne recevrez des

ordres directs de l'empereur, que lorsque sa majesté sera présente; mais vous continuerez vos rapports et états ainsi qu'il est établi.

Le major-général de l'armée,
(Signé) LE DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. XII.—A.

Charleroi, le 16 Juin, 1815.

MONSIEUR le maréchal, un officier de lanciers vient de dire à l'empereur que l'ennemi présentait des masses du côté des Quatre-Bras. Réunissez les corps des comtes Reille et d'Erlon, et celui du comte de Valmy, qui se met à l'instant en route pour vous rejoindre. Avec ces forces, vous devez battre et détruire tous les corps ennemis qui peuvent se présenter. Blucher était hier à Namur, et il n'est pas vraisemblable qu'il ait porté des troupes vers les Quatre-Bras : ainsi, vous n'avez affaire qu'à ce qui vient de Bruxelles.

Le maréchal Grouchy va faire le mouvement sur Sombref, que je vous ai annoncé, et l'empereur va se rendre à Fleurus : c'est là où vous adresserez vos nouveaux rapports à Sa Majesté.

(Signé,) Le maréchal d'empire, major-général,
DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. XII.—B.

Orders to Marshal Ney.

En avant de Fleurus, le 16 Juin,
à 2 heures.

Monsieur le maréchal, l'empereur me charge de vous prévenir que l'ennemi a réuni un corps de troupes entre Sombref et Bry, et qu'à deux heures et demie, M. le maréchal Grouchy, avec les troisième et quatrième corps, l'attaquera. L'intention de S. M. est que vous attaquiez aussi ce qui est devant vous, et qu'après l'avoir vigoureusement poussé, vous rabattiez sur nous, pour concourir à envelopper le corps dont je viens de vous parler. Si ce corps était enfoncé auparavant, alors S. M. ferait manœuvrer dans votre direction, pour hâter également vos opérations.

Instruisez de suite l'empereur de vos dispositions, et de ce qui se passe sur votre front.

(Signé,) le major-général, maréchal d'empire,
Duc de Dalmatie.

No. XIII.

Orders to Marshal Ney.

En avant de Fleurus, le 16 Juin, 1816,
à trois heures et un quart.

Monsieur le maréchal, je vous ai écrit, il y a une heure, que l'empereur ferait attaquer l'ennemi à 2 heures et demie dans la position qu'il a prise, entre St. Amand et Bry.

En ce moment, l'engagement est très-prononcé. Sa Majesté me charge de vous dire que vous devez manœuvrer sur le champ, de manière à envelopper la droite de l'ennemi, et tomber à bras raccourcis sur ses derrières. Cette armée est perdue si vous agissez vigoureusement; le sort de la France est dans vos mains. Ainsi, n'hésitez pas un instant pour faire le mouvement que l'empereur vous ordonne, et dirigez-vous sur les hauteurs de Bry et de St. Amand, pour concourir à une victoire peut-être décisive.

L'ennemi est pris en flagrant délit, au moment où il cherche à se réunir aux Anglais.

(Signé) le major-général,
DUC DE DALMATIE.

Cet ordre fut remis à 6 heures par M. Forbin-Janson.

No. XIV.

Col. Ponsonby's account of the attack made by his regiment at Waterloo, by Samuel Rogers, Esq.

Dear Lady Besborough,

You have often wished for some written account of the adventures and sufferings of your son Col. Ponsonby in the field of Waterloo. The modesty of his nature is, however, no small obstacle in the way. Will the following imperfect sketch serve, in any degree, till you can procure something better? The battle was alluded to one morning in the library at Althorp, and his answers to many of the questions which were put to him are here thrown together as nearly as I could remember in his own words.

"The clouds broke at noon, and the sun shone out a little just as the battle began. The armies were drawn up front to front, their distance from each other varying from eight to twelve hundred yards. A small valley lay between them, in which the videttes might be seen conversing. I was stationed with my regiment of cavalry, about three hundred strong, at the extreme of our left wing, and ordered to act discretionally.

"At one o'clock, observing, as we thought, some unsteadiness in a column of French infantry, fifty by twenty or thereabouts, which were advancing with an irregular fire, we resolved to charge them. As we descended, we received from part of our own line on the right a fire much more destructive than theirs; theirs having begun long before it could take effect, and slackening as we drew nearer. When we were within fifty paces of each other, they turned, and much execution was done among them, as we were followed by some Belgians who had seen our success; but we had no sooner passed through them, than we were ourselves attacked before we could form, by about three hundred Polish lancers, who had hastened to their relief, the French artillery pouring in among us a heavy fire of grape, though for one of our men they killed three of their own. In the *mêlée* I was almost instantly disabled in both of my arms, losing first my sword, and then my rein, and followed by a few of my men who were presently cut down, no quarter being asked or given, I was carried along by my horse till, receiving a blow from a sabre, I fell senseless on my face to the ground.

"Recovering, I raised myself a little to look round, being at that time, I believe, in a condition to get up and run away, when a lancer passing by, cried out, 'Tu n'est pas

mort, coquin?' and struck his lance through my back: my head dropped, the blood gushed into my mouth, a difficulty of breathing came on, and I thought all was over.

"Not long afterwards (it was then impossible to measure time, but I must have fallen in less than ten minutes after the onset) a tirailleur stopped to plunder me, threatening my life. I directed him to a small side pocket, in which he found three dollars, all I had; but he continued to threaten, and I said he might search me: this he did immediately, unloosing my stock and tearing open my waistcoat, and leaving me in a very uneasy posture.

"But he was no sooner gone, than an officer bringing up some troops, to which probably the tirailleur belonged, and happening to halt where I lay, stooped down and addressed me, saying, he feared I was badly wounded: I answered that I was, and expressed a wish to be removed into the rear: he said it was against their orders to remove even their own men, but that if they gained the day, (and he understood that the Duke of Wellington was killed, and that six of our battalions had surrendered) every attention in his power should be shown me. I complained of thirst, and he held his brandy-bottle to my lips, directing one of the soldiers to lay me straight on my side, and place a knapsack under my head: he then passed on into the action, soon perhaps to want, though not to receive, the same assistance; and I shall never know to whose generosity I was indebted as I believe for my life. Of what rank he was I cannot say: he wore a great coat.

"By and by, another tirailleur came up, a fine young man, full of ardour: he knelt down and fired over me, loading and firing many times, and conversing with me very gaily all the while: at last he ran off, saying, 'Vous serez bien

aise d'apprendre que nous allons nous rétirer. Bon jour, mon ami.'

"It was dusk when two squadrons of Prussian cavalry, each of them two deep, came across the valley, and passed over me in full trot, lifting me from the ground and tumbling me about cruelly: the clatter of their approach, and the apprehensions they excited, may be imagined: a gun taking that direction must have destroyed me.

"The battle was now at an end or removed to a distance. The shouts, the imprecations, the outcries of "Vive l'Empereur," the discharges of musketry and cannon were over, and the groans of the wounded all around me, became every instant more and more audible: I thought the night would never end.

"Much about this time, I found a soldier of the royals lying across my legs: he had probably crawled thither in his agony, and his weight, his convulsive motions, his noises, and the air issuing through a wound in his side, distressed me greatly; the last circumstance most of all, as I had a wound of the same nature myself.

"It was not a dark night, and the Prussians were wandering about to plunder; the scene in Ferdinand Count Fathom came into my mind, though no women appeared. Several stragglers looked at me as they passed by one after another, and at last one of them stopped to examine me. I told him as well as I could, for I spoke German very imperfectly, that I was a British officer, and had been plundered already: he did not desist, however, and pulled me about roughly.

"An hour before midnight I saw a man in an English uniform walking towards me: he was, I suspect, on the same errand, and he came and looked in my face. I spoke

instantly, telling him who I was, and assuring him of a reward if he would remain by me. He said he belonged to the 40th, and had missed his regiment; he released me from the dying soldier, and being unarmed, took up a sword from the ground and stood over me, pacing backwards and forwards.

"Day broke, and at six o'clock in the morning some English were seen at a distance, and he ran to them. A messenger being sent off to Harvey, a cart came for me, and I was placed in it and carried to the village of Waterloo, a mile and a half off, and laid in the bed from which Gordon, as I understood afterwards, had been just before carried out. I had received seven wounds: a surgeon slept in my room, and I was saved by excessive bleeding.

"Such probably is the story of many a brave man, yet to me it is new. The historian, describing military achievements, passes silently over those who go into the heat of the battle, though there, as we have seen, every character displays itself, and many a virtue is practised. The gay are still gay, the noble-minded are still generous; nor has the commander in his proudest moment a better claim to our admiration than the meanest of his soldiers, when relieving a fallen enemy in the midst of danger and death.

"The lances, from their length and weight, would have struck down my sword long before I had lost it, if it had not been bound to my hand. What became of my horse, I know not: it was the best I ever had.

"The men soon grow savage from being knocked about; the French make a great clamour in action: the English only shout.

"Much inconvenience would arise from allowing the wounded to be carried off, the men being ready on the slightest pretext to leave the field: it is not allowed in our armies.

"The man was still breathing when I was removed in the morning.

"Much confusion arose and many mistakes from similarity of dress: the Belgians, in particular, suffered greatly from their resemblance to the French, being on that day in the very same clothes they had worn under Buonaparte: our scarlet is more distinguishable than any other colour.

"Horses are very unwilling to go into battle, and cower and hang down their heads, when the balls whistle round them."

No. XV.

Au Maréchal Grouchy.

(Porté par l'adjutant-commandant Zenowich.)

En avant de la ferme de Caillou, le 18 Juin,
à dix heures du matin.

Monsieur le maréchal, l'empereur a reçu votre dernier rapport daté de Gembloux; vous ne parlez à sa majesté que des deux colonnes prussiennes qui ont passé à Sauvenières et Sarravalain; cependant des rapports disent qu'une troisième colonne, qui était assez forte, a passé à Gery et Gentines, se dirigeant sur Wavres.

L'empereur me charge de vous prévenir qu'en ce moment sa majesté va faire attaquer l'armée anglaise qui a pris position à Waterloo, près de la forêt de Soignes; ainsi sa majesté desire que vous dirigiez vos mouvements sur Wavres, afin de vous rapprocher de nous, vous

mettre en rapport d'opérations, et lier les communications, poussant devant vous les corps de l'armée prussienne qui ont pris cette direction, et qui auraient pu s'arrêter à Wavres, où vous devez arriver le plutôt possible. Vous ferez suivre les colonnes ennemies qui ont pris sur votre droite par quelques corps légers, afin d'observer leurs mouvements, et ramasser leurs traînards. Instruisez-moi immédiatement de vos dispositions et de votre marche, ainsi que des nouvelles que vous avez sur les ennemis, et ne négligez pas de lier vos communications avec nous; l'empereur desire avoir très-souvent de vos nouvelles.

Signé le major-général DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. XVI.

Au Maréchal Grouchy.

Du champ de bataille de Waterloo, le 18 à une heure après midi.

MONSIEUR le maréchal, vous avez écrit ce matin à deux heures à l'empereur que vous marcheriez sur Sarravalian; donc votre projet était de vous porter à Corbaix, ou à Wavres. Ce mouvement est conforme aux dispositions de sa majesté, qui vous ont été communiquées.

Cependant, l'empereur m'ordonne de vous dire que vous devez toujours manœuvrer dans notre direction. C'est à vous à voir le point où nous sommes, pour vous régler en conséquence, et pour lier nos communications, ainsi que pour être toujours en mesure pour tomber sur quelques troupes ennemies qui chercheraient à inquiéter notre droite,

et les écraser. En ce moment la bataille est gagnée sur la ligne de Waterloo. Le centre de l'ennemi est à Mont-Saint-Jean, ainsi manœuvrez pour joindre notre droite.

Signé Le Duc de Dalmatie.

P. S. Une lettre, qui vient d'être interceptée, porte que le général Bulow doit attaquer notre flanc; nous croyons apercevoir ce corps sur les hauteurs de Saint-Lambert; ainsi ne perdez pas un instant pour vous rapprocher de nous et nous joindre, et pour écraser Bülow, que vous prendrez en flagrant délit.

THE END.

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INVASION of FRANCE by the ALLIES. 1815.

Drawn & Engraved by Capt.ⁿ Batty.

Pub.ᵈ by R. Ackermann & Martin & W. Clarke, Bond St.ᵉᵗ & T. Egerton, Whitehall, 1820.

INVASION of BELGIUM by BONAPARTE

JUNE 1815.

Drawn by Capt. Batty 1st or Grenadier Reg.t Guards.

Engraved by Neele & Son Charlotte St.t Fitzroy Sq.re

Published the 1st of October 1815 by W. Clarke New Bond St.t


BATTLE of the 16th JUNE, 1815.
N.
GENAPPE
Road to Brussels
Road to Namur
Quatre Bras
Road to Charleroi
FRASNE
One Engh Mile
Anglo Belgian Army.
3d and 5th Divisions
1st Division
English Cavalry
Infantry
Nassau, Brunsw.
French Infantry
Infantry
Cavalry
Drawn by Capt. Batty, 1st or Grenadier Regt. Guards.
Hewitt & Co. Charlotte Str. Fitzroy Sq.

BATTLE
of the
18th JUNE, 1815.



Drawn by Capt.n Batty, 1st or Grenadier Regt. Guards.

Rev.d Sir Charles Abel Bart. Coll. Cant.

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